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ABSTRACT 
 
 
I advance an explanation for durable dominance—dominants’ enduring control of vastly 
disproportionate shares of contested resources in the face of mass entrepreneurial entry and 
increased competitive parity. I argue that increased, more potent competitive entry and more 
level rules of competition can benefit dominants. More and stronger new entrants 
disproportionately disadvantage non-dominants compared to dominants, and weaken near-
dominants’ ability to challenge dominants. Durable dominance is observed in many settings, for 
example, in the increased gap between the wealthiest in the U.S. and everyone else, and in 
industries where dominant companies maintain their dominance in open, competitive markets.  
I test the predictions of this theory in two settings. First, I investigate the implications of 
this theory with thirty years of data on competition among U.S. mutual funds. As predicted by 
the theory, the effects of increased competitive entry on incumbents were nonlinear: deleterious 
for incumbent funds on average, but beneficial for dominant funds. New entry of similar 
competitors depressed future annual flows of investor money into 96.5% of mutual funds, but the 
top 1.3% of mutual funds gained on average almost $70 million of assets under management 
from the entry of a similar competitor. Increased competitive entry also increased dominant 
funds’ probability of remaining dominant for longer than three years. 
Second, I examine the process of board seat accumulation for directors on the boards of 
S&P 1500 companies from 1997 to 2010. A shift in the dynamics of hiring eliminated 
preferential attachment. Those with many board seats (dominant directors) compared to those 
 
 
xiii 
 
with only one board seat were about twice as likely to gain another board seat in 2000, but no 
more likely by 2010. The theory predicts that such a leveled playing field should prevent non-
dominants from rising to dominance, and this prediction is supported in the data. Very few non-
dominant directors accrued many board seats and became dominant after the change in board 
appointment patterns. A Monte Carlo simulation supports the causal relationship between the 
changed micro-dynamics of hiring and the observed non-appearance of new dominant directors. 
This setting provides insight into a special case of the theory, where existing dominants 
disappeared. Dominant directors grew old and retired from board service. The “inner circle” of 
dominant directors, which held together the board interlock network of U.S. companies 
connected through shared directors, disappeared after a century of continued existence. 
The proposed theory suggests policy implications for dominants, non-dominants, and 
policy-makers in a variety of settings. I close by suggesting future investigations that could test 
the general applicability of the theory. I argue that the study of most-often-true “social laws” is a 
useful complement to the current focus on social mechanisms in organization theory.
 
 
1 
 
Chapter 1: 
Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Overview 
The number of mutual funds offered in the United States increased almost 30-fold from 
1976 to 2009, and the number of fund management companies more than quadrupled. Despite 
this influx of new competitors, Fidelity and Vanguard maintained dominant positions from the 
late 1970s onward, with each managing about 12% of the total net assets held in mutual funds as 
of 2009 (Khorana and Servaes, 2012). Fidelity and Vanguard’s entrenched dominance is far from 
the only instance of durable industry dominance. Budweiser beer, Wrigley gum, and Coca-Cola 
and Pepsi colas have all maintained dominance in their respective markets for decades.  
Beyond industry, the wealthy in the United States are also durably dominant. U.S. society 
as a whole has become more open over the past half-century, and many class-, ethnicity-, and 
gender-based barriers to entry into previously-exclusive cultural spheres and social organizations 
have weakened (Peterson and Kern, 1996; Khan, 2011). The elite as a class are also less cohesive 
than in previous decades (Mizruchi, 2013; Chu and Davis, 2013). Yet an increasing and very 
large proportion of resources in the United States is controlled by a small group of individuals, 
and entry into this elite group has become almost impossible for those not born elite (e.g., 
Kopczuk, Saez, and Song, 2010; Piketty and Saez, 2003).  
Today’s top movie stars have also maintained their dominance over many years—even as 
the number of new actors earning their first starring roles increased dramatically. Middle-aged 
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men (Brad Pitt, then age 48; George Clooney, 50; Johnny Depp, 48) and women (Sandra 
Bullock, 47; Meryl Streep, 62) topped the 2011 list of top box office draws
2
. The average age of 
the actors in the top 10 of this list rose from 38.5 years in 1990 to 46.2 in 2011. 
These examples are puzzling because dominance was durable, when we would expect it 
not to be. Increased competition in mutual funds and beer, and for movie roles, should have 
eroded dominants’ advantages. More open access and competitive parity in society should have 
led to more equality in wealth. This dissertation proposes an explanation for how such durable 
dominance occurs. I present theory that predicts that dominants—those with vastly 
disproportionate control of contested resources—benefit from increased competitive entry into 
their markets and decreased advantages of scale. Initial tests of the theory, with data on 
competition in the mutual fund industry and among corporate directors for additional board seats, 
support the theory’s predictions. 
After briefly defining durable dominance, the remainder of this chapter summarizes 
classical theories of dominant entrenchment—or sustained competitive advantage—and argues 
that we need to extend these theories to explain dominant entrenchment in contemporary 
contexts. Chapter 2 presents a simple model of processes that lead to dominant entrenchment in 
open, competitively level, resource-abundant settings. These models show how increased 
entrepreneurial entry and competitive parity can benefit dominants and entrench dominant/non-
dominant dichotomies. Durable dominance ensues when a highly-skewed distribution of 
resource levels is coupled with a less-skewed distribution of changes in resource levels. Results 
from an investigation of mutual funds’ competition for investments are presented in Chapter 3. 
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While the vast majority of incumbent mutual funds were adversely affected by increased 
entrepreneurial entry, the dominant few benefited immensely. Chapter 4 uses archival data and 
Monte Carlo simulation to investigate the dynamics of board appointments for directors of S&P 
1500 companies. Directors already on multiple boards were preferentially invited onto more 
boards before 2000, but this was no longer true by 2010. The disappearance of rich-get-richer 
dynamics stopped new dominant (many board) directors from emerging, with dramatic 
consequences for the shape of the U.S. corporate board interlock network. Chapter 5 summarizes 
the findings of the dissertation, and discusses the general validity and practical implications of 
the proposed theory. I argue that the establishment of social “laws” is a useful complement to the 
study of mechanisms in organization studies. 
 
1.2 The Paradox of Durable Dominance 
This dissertation advances an explanation for durable dominance. I define dominance as 
controlling a vastly disproportionate share of contested resources. For companies or their 
products, this means having an order of magnitude higher market share than the average 
competitor. For individuals in society, this means possessing a vastly disproportionate amount of 
wealth, power, fame, or career success. Ideas that attract a vastly disproportionate amount of 
attention and legitimacy are also dominant. Dominance is durable when it endures in the face of 
increased competitive entry and structural changes that level the playing field, attenuating the 
competitive advantages of scale
3
. 
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 Note that dominants need not be capable of agentic action. A scientific paradigm, for example, 
can be dominant. I talk of dominants “doing” things below for ease of presentation. Existing 
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Dominant Entrenchment in Economics, Strategy, and Sociology 
While scholars in the disciplines of economics, strategy, and sociology disagree on the 
desirability of dominant entrenchment—the continuous control of a vastly disproportionate share 
of contested resources by a fixed group of actors—there is broad theoretical agreement that 
increased numbers of competitors and more level (i.e., less scale-dependent) rules of competition 
make it harder for dominants to maintain their positions. Neoclassical economics asserted that 
competition optimizes social welfare, partially by preventing dominants from unduly 
maintaining their positions (Samuelson, 1947: Chapter 8). Following this logic, structuralists 
(Bain, 1968; Mason, 1939; Hunt, 1972) maintained that barriers to industry entry and intra-
industry mobility should be lowered to prevent monopolistic predation and oligopolistic 
collusion. Other economists (Stigler, 1968; Demsetz, 1973) argued instead that market 
dominance was often the result of firms’ successful innovation. Dominants could only maintain 
their positions by continually out-innovating competitors—as long as resources could flow 
between industries and the “lure of profit induces entry” (Fisher, 1979: 675). Some scholars 
asserted that even such innovation capability-based market dominance was inherently unstable 
against competitive pressures, with dominated industries providing fertile ground for “industrial 
mutation … that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly 
destroying the old” (Schumpeter, [1942] 1994: 83).  
Strategy scholars—for whom dominant entrenchment (i.e., sustained competitive 
advantage) is, in some respects, the Holy Grail—have built on these economic theories. Firms 
were advised to enter industries with high barriers to entry and to erect such barriers in their own 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
theory on dominance tends to assume agentic action. I show later that this is not necessary to 
maintain dominance. 
 
 
5 
 
industries (Porter, 1980), and to build distinctive capabilities. The resource-based view (Penrose, 
1959; Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991) deemed sustained competitive advantage possible only if 
dominants controlled unique resources—“assets, capabilities, organizational processes, firm 
attributes, information, knowledge, etc.” (Barney, 1991: 101)—that allowed them to execute 
their chosen strategies profitably, whereas other firms lacking these resources could not profit 
from the same strategies. Other theories argued that resource-based dominance was not durable, 
however. Challengers developing disruptive innovations—technologies that initially only 
address niche needs, but over time evolve to cost-effectively address the needs of the mass 
market—could nullify dominants’ resource advantages and usurp their positions (Christensen 
and Bower, 1996; Christensen, 1997). A sociologically-inspired line of reasoning suggested, 
furthermore, that the presence of one or more dominant firms in an industry fostered an 
abundance of small, niche-oriented competitors. This process of resource partitioning (Carroll, 
1985) would create fertile conditions for the development of disruptive innovations. 
Unlike strategy scholars, sociologists typically viewed elite entrenchment and durable 
inequality as moral ills to be diagnosed and cured, and focused on understanding individual, 
family, or class dominance in society. Early scholarship deemed the existence and domination of 
elites inevitable (Michels, [1911] 1962; Mosca, [1896] 1939), arguing that the challenges of 
organizing large groups invariably led to small cadres of well-coordinated governing elites. 
Indeed, a large number of social institutions—e.g., kinship ties, shared organizations, and 
business relationships—supporting cohesion and coordination among elites were identified 
during the twentieth century (Mills, 1956; Domhoff, 1967; 1970; Miliband, 1969; Useem, 1984; 
Mizruchi, 1992). Elites also distinguished themselves from non-elites by monopolizing certain 
types of resources—“economic, social, cultural, political, or knowledge capital” (Khan, 2012: 
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361; see also Tilly, 1998, on opportunity hoarding). U.S. elites during the Gilded Age sought to 
set themselves apart culturally by excluding non-elites from highbrow art and music, for example 
(Levine, 1990). Habits, tastes, and dispositions acquired at an early age helped elites succeed 
later in life (Bourdieu, 1984; DiMaggio and Mohr, 1985; Lamont, 1992).  
In sum, while scholars of economics, strategy, and sociology often disagreed on the value 
of dominant entrenchment and were focused on different units of analysis, they agreed that 
exclusion, collusion, and monopolization supported dominant entrenchment. High barriers to 
entry, whether into industries or social groups, preserved existing positions. Dominants, often 
collectively, used their disproportionate resources to maintain their advantages. Companies 
colluded in predatory pricing to bankrupt smaller competitors. Elite individuals instinctively 
preferred to help others from similar privileged backgrounds. Dominant companies and 
individuals alike banded together to collectively influence policy. Dominants attempted to 
monopolize valuable resources to keep them “rare, imperfectly imitable, and non-substitutable” 
(Barney, 1991: 116), and thus separate themselves from the non-dominant. 
There are settings where this common understanding does not hold, however. Dominants 
sometimes maintain their dominance in spite of massive influxes of new competitors, and 
regulatory, technology, and market changes that level competition and take away large 
competitors’ preferential access to key resources. The barriers to entry into the mutual fund 
market were low ($100,000 capitalization), and the number of new entrants into the industry 
exploded in the 1980s and 1990s. Yet Fidelity and Vanguard have maintained their dominance 
throughout. Manufacturing and distributing beer is no longer technically difficult—you can 
contract for both brewing and delivery. Yet Anheuser-Busch products have dominated the U.S. 
beer market since the end of Prohibition, maintaining almost 50% market share in the face of 
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growth in the number of U.S. breweries from 82 in 1980 to 2,126 in mid-2012. The number of 
new actors making their feature film starring debut each year has been increasing since 1990, yet 
the leading stars of 1990 maintained their ability to garner new starring roles and draw audiences 
in 2013. All but two of the top ten actors on Quigley’s list from 1990 were still active, with a 
starring role in at least one Hollywood release in the past year. Business academia has seen the 
blooming of “a thousand flowers” (Pfeffer, 1995) as the number of business authors, journals, 
theories, and articles increased dramatically, yet “we have become stuck in theories developed in 
the latter half of the twentieth century” (Schoonhoven, Meyer, and Walsh, 2005: 327). The 
apparent disappearance of a cohesive, distinct elite (Mizruchi, 2013; Chu and Davis, 2013) 
suggests that elites and privilege matter less in the U.S., and social elites are no longer 
distinguishable by their monopolization of highbrow culture (Peterson and Kern, 1996; Khan, 
2011). Yet over the past forty years, economic mobility in the United States has declined 
(Kopczuk, Saez, and Song, 2010), while the wealth gap between elite and non-elite has 
dramatically increased (Piketty and Saez, 2003). 
A focus on durable dominance is timely, as U.S. society and its subfields have become 
increasingly open, competitively level, and resource-abundant over the past half-century (see, 
e.g., Davis, 2013). Overt categorical barriers to entry into social enclaves have all but 
disappeared. Barriers to industry entry have similarly been lowered. New technologies and 
business norms have democratized access to resources previously available only to dominants, 
making them available for easy purchase. For example, even one-person companies now have 
access to scalable sources of financing, manufacturing, marketing, and distribution. 
Financialization has simplified the reallocation of resources across fields. More and more 
markets are becoming characterized by low barriers to entry, weakened size advantages, and 
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increased availability, transposibility, and portability of key resources. Theories from economics, 
strategy, and sociology need to be extended to explain entrenched dominance in this ever more 
open, level, and resource-abundant world. In the next chapter, I introduce a model that shows 
one way such durable dominance may occur.   
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Chapter 2: 
A Model of Durable Dominance 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces a model that describes causal processes leading from increased 
and more level competition to dominant entrenchment. The model is a stylized ecological model 
of resource-based market competition. I model resource distributions and trajectories in an 
industry characterized by two conditions:  
1) The industry is closed to new entry and exit.  
2) Companies with higher revenues can invest more in building future resources than 
competitors with lower revenues. 
I then examine the consequences of relaxing each of these conditions in turn—i.e., opening the 
market to new entry, and increasing competitive parity—and show that either of these changes 
can benefit dominants and lead to durable dominance, by preventing non-dominants from 
becoming dominant. Based on the model, I suggest a typology of processes that foster durable 
dominance and boundary conditions for the processes’ operation. I conclude the chapter by 
summarizing the theoretical predictions suggested by the model, and comparing these predictions 
to those of strategy theories of firm heterogeneity. The model’s predictions are contrary to those 
of established theories of competitive advantage. 
In presenting the model, I do not assert that the causal relationship between competition 
and dominant benefit will always hold, nor that the processes described are necessary for such a 
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relationship to hold. The model merely shows that the causal relationship is plausible, given 
certain boundary conditions. I will examine concerns of general validity and alternative 
mechanisms in Chapter 5, after establishing empirical support for the relationship between 
increased and more level competition and dominant entrenchment in Chapters 3 and 4.  
 
2.2 Classical Dominant Entrenchment 
Consider an industry, closed to new entry and exit, where companies with higher 
revenues can invest more than those with lower revenues into building resources—capabilities, 
attributes, and holdings that contribute to firm performance. Firms with higher levels of 
resources will have higher revenue. Also assume strong resource-based barriers to intra-industry 
mobility; firms which have previously done well are expected to continue doing well. We can 
model these conditions by assuming that the magnitude of change in revenue during each time 
period is stochastic and proportional to the firm’s current revenue—i.e., a rich-get-richer 
Matthew effect (Merton, 1968) holds. Formally:  
 
R(f, t+1) = R(f, t) × [1 + n(m, σ)]   (Equation 2.1) 
 
where a firm f has revenue R at time t, and n is a random value drawn for each firm and time step 
from a normal distribution with non-negative mean m and standard deviation σ. This equation 
approximates a random walk on a logarithmic scale, which after a sufficient number of time 
periods results in a highly-skewed, log-normal distribution of revenues across firms (cf. Gibrat, 
1931). Such highly-skewed distributions are commonly observed in real industries 
(Schmalensee, 1989: 994). 
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Dominants naturally emerge under these conditions. Because of the multiplicative nature 
of the trajectories of revenues, one or two firms will end up with thousands or millions of times 
the revenue of the median firm after a sufficient period of time, even if all firms start with the 
same initial revenue and no firm is inherently better than another. On the other hand, the identity 
of the firm with the lion’s share of revenues can and does change. Again because of the 
compounding inherent in the Matthew effect, non-dominant firms can rise into dominant 
positions and dominant firms can lose their positions over sufficient time. Dominants’ reigns are 
limited in duration in the absence of sustained predation, collusion, or dominant-led innovation. 
 
2.3 Change in Resource Distributions 
Dominants may become entrenched, however, if a large number of new entrants enter the 
market. Figure 2.1 presents stylized revenue distributions in an industry before competitive 
entry. The distribution of revenue levels is highly-skewed, approximating a power law 
distribution. If we assume that firms compete primarily against those with similar revenues (as 
strategic group theory [Caves and Porter, 1977] predicts), firms with larger revenues will have 
fewer direct competitors. A firm with $100 million in revenue may compete against only ten 
direct competitors, while a firm with $10 million in revenue competes against 100 similar 
companies. This reasoning implies that the revenue distribution curve equates to a competitive 
intensity curve.  
---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2.1 about here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
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Figure 2.2 shows revenue distributions—the competitive intensity curve—after massive 
industry entry. Entering firms rarely enter with resources of the level of dominants, since 
dominant firms have resources that are of the order of magnitude of the total resources in the 
industry. Entrants often enter with resources greater than the median incumbent firm, however, 
because entry is endogenous—a firm will not enter the market unless its management believes 
that the firm possesses, or can quickly build, a competitive level of resources. 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2.2 about here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
After mass entry, the competitive intensity curve flattens up to a revenue threshold 
corresponding to the thinning of the right tail of the new entrant revenue curve. Incumbents with 
revenue an order of magnitude above this threshold (indicated by Rt in Figure 2.2) do not 
experience appreciable changes in the number of similar-size competitors. Firms with revenue of 
the same order of magnitude as the threshold, on the other hand, experience a dramatic increase 
in the number of their direct competitors. These unfortunate incumbents are forced to devote 
more of their resources to competition against similar competitors, and have less slack left to 
challenge larger incumbents. To the extent that incumbent near-dominants must divert resources 
to defend against new entrants’ advances, incumbents above the threshold—now durable 
dominants—face less threat from competition below and become entrenched in their dominant 
positions.  
This argument is not dependent on the specific shape of the competitive intensity curve 
after mass entry. The only assumption needed is that mass entry does not happen at the highest 
resource levels. If this assumption holds, there will be a point where the changed competitive 
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intensity curve slopes down more severely than the curve before mass entry. Those few 
incumbents to the right of this point benefit; those immediately to the left suffer. Those who 
benefit are always a minority because of the skewed shape of the revenue distribution curve—the 
vast majority of incumbents have the lowest levels of resources. 
Incumbents near the threshold also suffer from a dilution of consumer attention. Consider 
an industry with one dominant firm and ten near-dominant firms. Consumers may attempt to 
compare the offerings from each of these eleven firms when making a purchase decision. A 
lucky or good near-dominant may gain business and successfully challenge the dominant and 
take over its position. Successful challenges become unlikely if mass entry of new competitors 
creates 90 more near-dominant firms, however. Search costs will preclude consumers from 
carefully comparing offerings from the 101 dominant and near-dominant firms. A near-dominant 
firm attempting to overtake the dominant will find it harder to distinguish itself from other near-
dominants, while the dominant firm will strengthen its consumer recognition and distinctiveness. 
Entrants in this model need not be newly-established firms, but can be established firms 
entering new (to them) industries. A special case worth considering is the effect of market 
mergers from processes of industry convergence (when companies from multiple industries 
come to compete in the same product market) or globalization (when companies from different 
geographical markets come to compete in a single world-wide market). If pre-convergence or 
pre-globalization resource distributions are highly-skewed within each market, and the size 
distribution of the pre-merger markets is also highly-skewed, then the post-market merger 
resource distribution will have a shape similar to the distribution predicted after mass entry 
(Figure 2.2). Near-dominant firms in the post-merger market will face sharply increased 
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competition, benefiting the dominant firm from the largest pre-merger market. This largest 
dominant will enjoy entrenched dominance in the newly merged market.  
 
2.4 Change in Resource Trajectories 
Dominants also become entrenched if the playing field in the competition for revenue 
growth is “leveled” by making increases in revenues independent of existing revenue size—i.e., 
eliminating the Matthew effect so the poor can gain or lose as much wealth in each time step as 
the rich. If Bill Gates was constrained to gain or lose $1,000 a day, his position atop the wealth 
distribution would be frozen in place. Even if he lost $1,000 every day for 50 years, he would 
lose less than $20 million of his $70 billion
4
 fortune. Conversely, a penniless graduate student 
gaining $1,000 every day over the same period would amass less than $20 million—a large sum 
to the student but much below Gates’s wealth5. Leveling the playing field leads to entrenched 
dominants. Dominants’ levels of contested resources never diminish to non-dominant levels, and 
non-dominants can never become dominant.  
Formally, when resource level changes become additive where they were previously 
multiplicative: 
 
R(f, t+1) = R(f, t) + n(m2, σ2)    (Equation 2.2) 
                                                          
 
4
 Forbes, May 2013. 
5
 Indeed, the introduction of this rule would cement Gates’s position atop the list of the world’s 
richest people, protecting him from being overtaken even by those such as Carlos Slim, whose 
net worth Forbes estimates at $69.86 billion. Note that the graduate student could catch up to 
Gates’s wealth if the daily flat bet was of an order of magnitude similar to Gates’s wealth. This 
scenario—equivalent to debasing U.S. currency so that $100 million is a reasonable day’s 
wages—is unlikely, however. 
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the probability of dominant displacement effectively vanishes across wide ranges of values for 
average change in resource level m2 and standard deviation σ2. 
 This change in resource trajectories can act directly to stop non-dominants from 
accumulating dominant levels of resources as detailed above. Such a change can also entrench 
dominants indirectly by changing the resource distribution. In the Bill Gates example above, if 
everyone’s net worth moved up or down by $1,000 each day, many more people could amass 
wealth on the order of a few million dollars. (And those with a million dollars would find their 
fortunes more precarious.) This increase in the number of multi-millionaires would benefit those 
with wealth above this threshold in ways laid out in Section 3 of this chapter. 
  
2.5 Conditions of Durable Dominance 
In the models described above, the introduction of more open and level competition has 
differential effects on dominants and non-dominants. In fields where previous conditions allowed 
dominants to emerge (i.e., a small group of firms amassed disproportionate resources orders of 
magnitude higher than the average firm), mass entrepreneurial entry and increased competitive 
parity entrench dominant positions. It is worthwhile to consider the general principle behind 
these results: Durable dominance occurs when the distribution of contested resources is highly-
skewed, and the distribution of changes in contested resource levels for non-dominants is less-
skewed. Then non-dominants with levels of contested resources an order of magnitude below 
dominants’ levels cannot accrue resources of the order of magnitude necessary to overtake 
dominants.  
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The distribution of changes in resource levels for non-dominants can become less-skewed 
through two types of processes. The first type of process affects the dynamics of resource 
accumulation indirectly by changing the competitive intensity curve. Such distribution changes 
may stem from increased de novo entry into the industry, or processes of industry convergence 
and globalization. The second type of process entails a change in the micro-dynamics of resource 
accumulation—for example, weakening of rich-get-richer effects. This second type of process 
may also change the shape of the competitive intensity curve, further lowering the probability 
that the non-dominant can take large steps to become dominant. 
The reasoning above rests upon three assumptions about the nature of resources, and the 
effects of the proposed mechanisms will be stronger to the degree these assumptions are met in a 
given setting:  
1) Resources and revenue are abundant and scalable—that is, levels of resources and 
revenue can differ between firms by many orders of magnitude.  
2) All actors share and have access to the same types of resources; no actor holds a 
proprietary resource that locks out competitors.  
3) Only aggregate resource levels matter in determining an actor’s success; there are no 
resources that are crucial, and no resource combinations which are more potent than 
others. This last assumption is equivalent to assuming that all resources are equally 
transposable to each other.  
Note that all three assumptions are satisfied if we assume that all needed resources can be 
bought and sold easily—that is, factor markets are efficient (cf. Barney, 1986). Money is 
inherently scalable and widely-held. If it can be used to buy all needed resources, then aggregate 
levels of cash become the key to determining success. Development of technologies of 
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outsourcing, distributed contract manufacturing, and network organization strengthens the effects 
of the proposed mechanisms. 
Beyond these assumptions, the model imposes few constraints on the types and 
characteristics of actors, resources, outcomes, and competition. Dominants need not engage in 
agentic anti-competitive action, such as predatory pricing, collusion, or political influence to 
maintain dominance. Indeed, dominants need not to be capable of action at all. Popular ideas 
may become durably dominant if the number of competing ideas increases rapidly, for example. 
The theory developed above should apply across a variety of settings.  
 
2.6 Distinctive Theoretical Predictions 
The reasoning above predicts distinctive non-linear effects of increased and more level 
competition. Increased competitive entry will reduce flows of contested resources to non-
dominant incumbents. Dominants, on the other hand, will benefit and receive an increased flow 
of contested resources compared to non-dominants, and the expected reign of dominants will 
lengthen. Increased competitive parity between actors with disparate levels of contested 
resources will have the same effects. 
These outcomes arise because of the differential effect of increased competition on near-
dominants compared to dominants. Increased competitive entry disproportionately increases 
competitive intensity for near-dominants compared to dominants. Decreased advantages of scale 
weaken near-dominants’ ability to cross the gap separating them from dominants. The benefits to 
dominants of increased competition are greater in settings where key resources are abundant and 
widely-available. These conditions make it harder for near-dominants to defend their positions 
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against new competitors and prevent near-dominants from building unique, inimitable, and 
valuable capabilities that can be leveraged to challenge dominants. 
These predictions are quite different from—often opposite to—the predictions of 
established theories of sustained competitive advantage. To my knowledge, none of the major 
theories of heterogeneity in firm performance predict a nonlinear effect of increased competition 
that benefits only the few dominants in an industry. On the other hand, almost all theories of firm 
heterogeneity assume some mechanism of exclusion, whereby dominants monopolize access to 
resources. 
Strategy scholars typically classify sources of firms’ performance advantage (most often 
profit, but sometimes revenue or market share) as stemming from either privileged market 
positions or unique resources (e.g., Cool, Costa, and Dierickx, 2002). Privileged market positions 
allow dominants to protect their position through strategic commitments or network externalities. 
Strategic commitments (or sunk costs; Sutton, 1991) by dominants in building resources such as 
brand recognition or production capacity can entrench dominants by removing the incentive for 
challengers to similarly invest in increased scale or scope, if the anticipated cost for a challenger 
to build scale-efficient resources is larger than the anticipated benefit. Expected benefits are 
smaller for challengers than for dominants who have already built up their resources, because 
challengers who invest must compete for market share with dominants who have already 
invested. The proposed theory complicates the picture, predicting that dominant entrenchment 
will be strengthened by increased entrepreneurial entry. As consumer demand is further divided 
among incumbent and new firms, non-dominant incumbents’ potential benefits from resource 
investments decrease, weakening their incentives to grow larger.  
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Network externalities (e.g., Katz and Shapiro, 1992) are also portrayed as locking in 
dominant advantage, by increasing value and switching costs for consumers and suppliers. The 
classic network strategy is to exclude the strongest competitors from your own platform, while 
increasing the number of other parties who use your platform. The proposed theory suggests that 
a better way for the strongest firm to maintain dominance would be to invite all competitors to 
compete on the same network platform, and to support the smallest competitors so that they grow 
to compete against and weaken larger competitors. Sharing the same resources (such as the 
network platform) is better for maintaining dominance than allowing competing—and possibly 
disruptive—sets of resources to be developed. 
This last observation drives home the boundary between the proposed theory and theories 
of unique resource-based heterogeneity (Barney, 1991) and disruptive innovation (Schumpeter 
[1942] 1994; Christensen, 1997). Unique resource-based competitive advantage requires that 
resources be imperfectly mobile and imperfectly imitable. Dominants can protect their resource 
advantages through rich-get-richer economies of resource accumulation (either mass efficiencies 
or connectedness of asset stocks; Dierickx and Cool, 1989) and barriers to imitation (time 
compression diseconomies, causal ambiguity [Lippman and Rumelt, 1982; Reed and DeFillippi, 
1990], or exclusivity). The resource-based view does not satisfactorily explain sustained 
heterogeneity in settings where rich-get-richer resource dynamics are absent, and resources are 
abundant and widely-available, however. In such settings, theory such as that presented in this 
dissertation is needed to explain durable dominance. 
Like the resource-based view, Christensen’s (1997) theory of disruptive innovation 
assumes that dominants control resources different from those of non-dominants. Non-dominant, 
niche players who lack the technology to successfully address the mainstream market use their 
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inferior but cheaper technologies to meet niche market needs. Over time, some of these 
originally-inferior technologies evolve enough that they can address mainstream market needs at 
low cost. Challengers who control these new mainstream-capable technologies displace 
incumbent dominants. The existence of proprietary, non-shared resources is essential for this 
narrative of disruptive innovation; the reasoning suggests that disruptive innovation will be 
unlikely in industries where key resources are abundant and widely-available. In such settings, 
the dearth of disruptive innovation will increase the duration of durable dominance. 
The proposed theory will apply to an increasing number of settings in a world where 
resources are becoming abundant and widely-available. One factor driving this resource trend is 
the increased availability of outsourced services. In durable product markets, for example, the 
rise of contract manufacturing services has eliminated the need for upfront investment in 
dedicated production capacity. You no longer need to own a factory to produce goods, and you 
can often scale production from single-unit prototypes to millions of units easily with the help of 
offshore OEM manufacturers. Marketing, sales, and distribution are even easier to scale using 
Internet-based services.  
It is important to understand how industry dynamics are affected by this trend towards 
financialization of key industry resources. What happens when money, which is inherently 
abundant (i.e., a large total amount exists) and widely-available (almost everyone can have some 
money), can efficiently purchase all the necessary expertise and resources for firm success? To 
answer this question, it is instructive to study industries where competitive dynamics have 
historically centered around abundant and widely-available resources. In the next chapter, I 
present a first test of the proposed theory in a setting where money itself—in the form of 
consumer investments—was (and is) the contested resource.  
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 2.1: Revenue Distribution with Matthew Effect and No Entry 
 
 
 
Stylized illustration of highly-skewed (power law) revenue distribution, or competitive intensity 
curve, in a market with no exit or entry, and rich-get-richer dynamics. Companies with higher 
revenue levels have fewer competitors with similar revenues.  
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Figure 2.2: Revenue Distribution with Matthew Effect and Mass Entry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Competitive intensity curve (solid line) after market is opened to entry. Mass entry of new 
competitors changes the shape of the competitive intensity curve, increasing competitive 
intensity for firms near the threshold. In the stylized case depicted above, the number of similar 
competitors for an incumbent with revenue level Rt increases by almost two orders of magnitude. 
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Chapter 3: 
Durable Dominance in the U.S. Mutual Fund Industry, 1980-2010: 
Increased Competitive Entry Benefits Dominants 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes an initial test of the proposed theory in the context of U.S. 
domestic equity mutual funds. Analysis using thirty years of data on competition among mutual 
funds supports the theory’s predictions: While increased entrepreneurial entry reduced 
investment flows into incumbent funds on average, dominant mutual funds—those with orders of 
magnitude higher assets under management compared to competitors with similar portfolio 
holdings—benefited from increased competition. Heightened entrepreneurial entry increased 
flows into dominant funds and entrenched them in their dominant positions. 
I examine the competitive dynamics of open-ended U.S. domestic equity mutual funds 
from 1980 to 2010. Mutual funds compete against each other to secure investor assets to manage. 
This market was competitive in recent years; increased competitive entry decreased incumbents’ 
future flows of assets under management (Wahal and Wang, 2011). The proposed theory predicts 
that these competitive effects should be non-linear, with flows into dominants behaving 
differently from flows into non-dominants. 
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Hypothesis 1: Increased entry will increase flows of assets into dominant funds 
compared to flows into non-dominant incumbent funds.  
 
Figure 3.1 helps clarify the predictions of this hypothesis. We know from recent research 
(e.g., Wahal and Wang, 2011) that the average incumbent loses future flows of assets when 
similar funds enter the market. Hypothesis 1 predicts that this effect is not uniform across 
relative fund sizes (Figure 3.1, Panel A), nor linear in relative fund sizes (Panel B). The predicted 
effect is instead non-linear, with only a small minority of the largest in relative size funds 
benefiting from competitive entry, while all other funds suffer (Panel C). 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3.1 about here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Flows of assets into non-dominant funds should decrease when new entry increases. On 
the other hand, flows into dominant funds increase, as dominant funds face weakened 
competition from near-dominants. This strengthened position will also lead to dominant funds 
remaining dominant longer. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Increased entry will increase the probability of dominant funds remaining 
dominant for longer time periods. 
 
The mutual fund setting is well-suited for the current inquiry in three ways. First, this 
setting appears to be characterized by durable dominance. Dominant companies maintained their 
position in the face of mass influx of new competitors. Barriers to entry were low, contested 
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resources were scalable, and the resources needed to operate a fund were widely-available. This 
setting thus provides a testbed to examine whether dominant entrenchment can be explained by 
the proposed theory’s predictions of non-linear effects of increased competitive entry6. Second, 
data are available for the whole population without survivor bias for a suitably long period. 
Finally, the setting is substantively important. Mutual funds have grown to occupy a central 
place in the U.S. economy during the period under study. 
 
3.2 The Development of the U.S. Mutual Fund Industry 
As of 2009, $11.1 trillion was invested in U.S. mutual funds. This figure corresponded to 
more than one fifth of total U.S. household net worth, which stood at $54.2 trillion. Mutual funds 
were not always so consequential, however. Mutual funds managed only $51 billion in 1976, less 
than 1% of the total U.S. household net worth of $5.8 trillion
7
.  
The tremendous growth (17.72% CAGR during the 33 years from 1976 to 2009) in 
mutual funds’ assets under management was driven by several factors. The 1980s and 1990s 
were bull markets for both stocks and bonds, making them attractive alternatives to traditional 
bank offerings. Perhaps more importantly, during this period, employer-managed, defined-
benefit retirement plans were largely superseded by newly-available employee-managed, 
                                                          
 
6
 The empirical studies in this dissertation examine settings where entrenched dominance is 
observed in the face of increased competitive entry or decreased scale advantages. The goal of 
these studies is to establish the non-linear and disparate effects of increased or more level 
competition on dominants versus non-dominants. Future studies should examine contexts with 
less observed dominant entrenchment, and lower levels of resource abundance and availability to 
test the effect of different boundary conditions. 
7
 Data on investments in mutual funds and defined contribution plans from Investment Company 
Institute Fact Book (2012, 2010). Data on U.S. household net worth published by the Federal 
Reserve, downloaded from http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/Z1/20100311/z1r-1.pdf., 
http://.../ Current/annuals/a1975-1984.pdf. 
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defined-contribution plans, such as 401(k)s and IRAs. 401(k) plans were first offered in 1982, 
and became hugely popular after the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986
8
. The 1986 Tax 
Reform Act also introduced individual retirement accounts (IRAs). By 2009, $4 trillion was held 
in defined contribution plans (401(k), 403(b), 457) and another $4.4 trillion in IRAs. Mutual 
funds managed a large portion of the assets in these self-managed retirement plans. Fifty-five 
percent of the assets in defined contribution plans and 45% of the assets in IRAs were held in 
mutual funds at the end of 2009. Innovation in the types of funds available was another factor 
driving demand (and vice versa). Money market, index, tax-exempt bond, sector, international, 
target date, and exchange-traded funds were all introduced in the late 1970s to 1990s.  
Burgeoning consumer demand and an increased supply of experienced fund management 
professionals created a surge of entrepreneurial entry into the mutual fund management market. 
The number of companies offering mutual funds increased from 134 to 584 from 1976 to 2009 
(Khorana and Servaes, 2012). Accounting for exits, the number of new management companies 
entering the market during this period was much higher—in the thousands. The number of 
mutual funds also increased dramatically, as new entrants and incumbent management 
companies competed to offer more choices to investors. The number of open-end mutual funds 
increased from 385 in 1976 to 11,452 in 2009, a compound annual growth rate of 10.9%
9
.  
Despite the influx of new competitors and innovations, the top management companies 
maintained market dominance. Fidelity and Vanguard increased their market shares from 6% and 
3.6% respectively in 1976 to about 12% each in 2009 (Khorana and Servaes, 2012). Such 
                                                          
 
8
 Employee Benefit Research Institute (2005), downloaded from 
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/facts/0205fact.a.pdf. 
9
 My analysis using data from Khorana and Servaes, 2012. 
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continued dominance may suggest that the market for investors’ assets was not competitive—
perhaps because of “stickiness” of already-invested funds. Prominent critics (Bogle, 2003; 
Swensen, 2005; Spitzer, 2004; Freeman and Brown, 2001) argued that mutual funds did not 
compete in a competitive market. Others (e.g., Coates and Hubbard, 2007; Wahal and Wang, 
2011; Khorana and Servaes, 2012) responded, however, with economic arguments and empirical 
evidence suggesting that the mutual fund market was indeed a competitive market. Wahal and 
Wang’s (2011) study was particularly suasive. They developed a portfolio-overlap measure of 
competitive intensity between incumbents and new entrants, and found that, after 1998, 
“[i]ncumbents that have a high overlap with entrants subsequently … experience quantity 
competition through lower investor flows, have lower alphas, and higher attrition rates” (Wahal 
and Wang, 2011: 40).  
 
3.3  Data 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 predict non-linear, interactive effects of increased competitive entry 
and fund size relative to competitors. Funds an order of magnitude larger than similar 
competitors should benefit from increased entry, while others suffer. To test the hypotheses, I 
created a dataset combining mutual fund data from CRSP with holdings information from the 
Thomson Financial CDA/Spectrum database. I used the MFLINKS database to link mutual fund 
identifiers from the former to the latter. The dataset covers open-end U.S domestic equity mutual 
funds from 1980 to 2010 (the Thomson database starts its coverage in 1980 and covers only 
mutual funds with U.S. domestic equity holdings), and contains slightly over 130,000 fund-
quarter observations of 5,532 mutual funds.  
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Funds were defined as competing against each other to the extent that they held the same 
stocks in similar proportions. I calculated pair-wise cosine similarity measures between each pair 
of funds existing in the same time period (approximately 313 million pairs) using holdings data. 
Two funds were defined to be similar if they held the same stocks in similar proportions. A 
fund’s holdings can be represented as a vector in a large-dimensional space where each 
dimension is one stock and the vector component along each dimension is the dollar amount of 
the fund’s holdings in that stock. Two funds are similar to the degree that their holding vectors 
point in the same direction. If the funds hold exactly the same stocks in the same proportions, the 
vectors are aligned, the angle between them is 0 degrees and the cosine of this angle equals one. 
If the vectors have no stocks in common, the vectors are perpendicular, and the cosine of this 90 
degree angle equals zero (see Appendix 1 for more detail on this measure). 
The main dependent variables are 1) flow of assets next 12 months and 2) dichotomous 
variables indicating whether a fund is dominant one, two, three, and five year(s) later (dominant 
in year+n). I define dominant funds as those funds with an order of magnitude or larger assets 
under management compared to the average assets under management of similar competitors. 
The independent variable of interest is (dominant fund) x (new entrant overlap), the interaction 
term of the similarity-averaged number of new entrants and whether the focal fund is currently 
dominant or not. Control variables include those identified in previous studies of mutual funds 
(e.g., Wahal and Wang, 2011), such as measures of previous flows of assets into the focal fund, 
fund returns and return volatility, fund size, age, fee level, and portfolio turnover. I add a 
measure of flow of assets into similar funds to control for overall segment growth. I also control 
for the total assets under management at the focal mutual fund’s management company. (See 
Table 3.1 for specifics of these constructs.) 
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---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3.1 about here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
The identity of the fund’s management company is not included as a control variable 
because this variable does not change value during the study period for almost all of the funds in 
the dataset, and so is collinear with fund fixed effects. Most funds remain under the same 
ownership throughout their lifetimes. Including fixed effects for mutual funds effectively 
controls for management company characteristics (e.g., a Fidelity or Vanguard effect). 
 
3.4 Analysis and Results  
The first step in the analysis was to substantively replicate Wahal and Wang’s (2011) 
results, which found that new competitive entry decreased flows into incumbent funds. Their 
data differ from mine in several ways. They ended their sample in 2005, their measure of new 
entrant overlap was defined differently, they used an ordinal variable coded 0, 1, and 2 for funds 
with bottom 20%, middle 60%, and top 20% performance respectively instead of a z-score, they 
included front-end load as a control variable, and they do not control for the size of total flows 
into similar funds. An additional difference is that Wahal and Wang used Fama-MacBeth 
regressions, while I use fixed-effect panel regressions. Notwithstanding these differences, the 
results are substantively identical. On average, new competitive entry led to decreased asset flow 
into incumbent funds. 
The second regression tested the prediction (Hypothesis 1) that new entrant overlap 
would be beneficial to dominant incumbents but deleterious to non-dominants, by adding the 
dominant fund variable and the (dominant fund) × (new entrant overlap) interaction term. 
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Results are shown in Model 1 of Table 3.2
10
. As predicted by the proposed theory, the coefficient 
of the interaction term was significant and positive. Expected asset flow over the next 12 months 
decreased by $3.8 million for each unit increase in new entrant overlap for non-dominant funds. 
Dominant funds, on the other hand, benefited from increased competitive entry. Expected asset 
flow into dominant funds increased by $66.2 million for each unit increase in new entrant 
overlap. 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3.2 about here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
To further check that the effect of new entrant overlap was indeed non-linear and not just 
a linear interaction effect with the size ratio, I examined the effects of increased new competitive 
entry at various levels of the size ratio. I created z-scores for the size ratio across each time 
period, then binned the observations using this z-score as shown in Table 3.3. I created dummy 
variables (bin 1, bin 2, …, bin 11) for each bin, and re-ran the regression using (bin 1, bin 2, …, 
bin 11) and (bin 1, bin 2, …, bin 11) × (new entrant overlap) instead of dominant fund and 
(dominant fund) × (new entrant overlap).  
                                                          
 
10
 Including the lagged dependent variable on the right side of the fixed effect panel regression 
equation can lead to inconsistent and biased results. These errors should not substantively affect 
the reported results, however, given the current study’s observed levels of residual 
autocorrelation and the large number of time periods. Additionally, estimates of the effects of 
non-lagged dependent variables will be biased downwards (Keele and Kelly, 2006), so the 
reported significant effects are, if anything, under-estimated. In any case, alternative analyses 
using Arellano-Bond difference and system GMMs also supported the hypothesis. 
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----------------------------------------------------  
Insert Table 3.3 about here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 3.2 and Model 2 in Table 3.2 show the results from this regression. The difference 
in the coefficient for (bin 10) × (new entrant overlap) and (bin 11) × (new entrant overlap) 
compared to the other interaction terms is striking. Non-dominants—about 96.5% of 
observations—lost assets when similar new competitors entered the market, but dominants—
approximately the top 3.5%—gained tremendously from new competitive entry. The top 1.3% of 
funds each gained on average almost $70 million in new assets under management for each 
similar new competitor, while the next 2.2% gained on average slightly over $20 million in 
increased asset flow. Models 1 and 2 both support Hypothesis 1’s prediction of a non-linear 
effect of competitive entry on dominants versus non-dominants. 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3.2 about here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
I next examined the effects of new entry on dominants’ (non-dominants’) chances of 
maintaining (attaining) dominance in later years to test Hypothesis 2. Table 3.4 shows the results 
of these regressions. Dominant funds’ chances of staying dominant three or five years later were 
positively influenced by increases in new entrant overlap, as predicted by the theory. Each new 
entry by a similar competitor increased the probability the dominant fund would remain 
dominant in three years by 12%. New entrant overlap had no impact on the chances of becoming 
dominant for non-dominant funds. While the focal fund’s size ratio significantly predicted the 
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probability of being dominant up to five years into the future, currently being dominant was only 
consequential in determining whether the fund was dominant the following year. 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3.4 about here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
These results support the predictions of the proposed theory. Increased entry of similar 
funds decreased non-dominant incumbents’ future flows of assets, but increased dominants’ 
future flows. Increased competitive entry also increased the probability of dominant funds 
maintaining dominance for three or more years. On the other hand, in the absence of new 
competitive entry, a fund’s current dominance significantly predicted continued dominance only 
in the following year. In sum, increased entry disadvantaged non-dominant incumbents, but 
benefited and entrenched dominants.    
 
3.5 Robustness Checks 
A series of robustness checks provide additional support for these results. The effects 
described above are robust to defining competitors in different ways. Regressions using CRSP 
segment codes instead of overlap measures yielded substantially similar results to those seen in 
Model 2. CRSP segment codes are used inconsistently over the years, however. Further 
robustness tests should use social network community detection algorithms to divide funds into 
communities. Funds can be considered linked if their cosine similarity is greater than zero, and 
the strength of the link defined as the cosine similarity between the funds. 
Using different definitions of new entry does not substantively change the results. The 
definition above counts a fund as a new entrant only if it is a newly-formed fund. An existing 
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fund may also come into competition with a focal fund when either fund changes its portfolio 
composition to be more similar to the other. To examine effects of overall competition increase, I 
replaced new entrant overlap with change in competitive overlap in the regression models. 
Competitive overlap was calculated for each fund at each time period as the sum of pair-wise 
cosine similarities for the focal fund across all other funds existing in the time period (and not 
just new entrants). Change in competitive overlap is defined as the net difference between the 
current value of competitive overlap and the value 12 months prior.  
Regressions using data from 1980 to 1998 yielded the same substantive results for the 
independent variables of interest. This is in contrast to Wahal and Wang’s (2011) findings, which 
showed no effects of competitive entry on incumbent fund flows before 1998. One possible 
reason for their null result is that they were averaging across dominants and non-dominants. The 
mutual fund industry grew tremendously from 1980 to 1998. The large number of new entrants 
may have resulted in greatly increased flow to dominants that offset any decrease in flows to 
non-dominants, resulting in an average effect that was not significant. Another possible reason 
for their null result is that they did not control for total flows into similar funds. A rising tide may 
have lifted all boats.  
  
3.6 Discussion 
Increased competitive entry of similar competitors was found to be beneficial for 
dominant mutual funds, and detrimental for non-dominant mutual funds. The results support the 
theory advanced in Chapter 2. Further investigations are needed to establish the mechanisms 
responsible for this effect. Such investigations may examine whether this effect was driven by 
fund management actions (i.e., changes in portfolio strategy and marketing in response to 
 
 
34 
 
competition), or consumer actions (e.g., a higher probability of investing in dominant funds 
when faced with too many similar choices). Data on the evolving structure of the mutual fund 
industry and its segments, such as that outlined in Appendix A, may be useful for these further 
investigations. 
This study consisted of analysis at the mutual fund level rather than the management 
company level. What do these findings tell us about competition among management companies, 
especially the durable dominance of Vanguard and Fidelity? A partial answer to this question can 
be obtained by examining each management company’s dominant funds. As of 2009, five 
dominant funds
11
 contributed 43% of Fidelity’s total net assets under management. The 
remaining 57% of Fidelity’s total net assets under management was split across 111 non-
dominant funds. Explaining the durable dominance of the five dominant funds explains much of 
Fidelity’s durable dominance. 
While a Fidelity fund enjoys distribution and marketing advantages compared to funds 
from smaller management companies, this by itself is not enough to make the fund dominant 
(only 5 of 116 Fidelity funds were dominant in 2009). Indeed, the causality may be in the reverse 
direction—a durably dominant fund may keep Fidelity dominant. Consider this plausible 
(congruent with known facts) explanation of Fidelity’s durable dominance: Fidelity had a 
dominant fund as the number of mutual fund entrants soared. Many of these newly formed funds 
were similar (in portfolio allocation) to Fidelity’s dominant fund, making the fund durably 
dominant. Fidelity took some of the profits from its now durably-dominant fund, and used them 
to establish many more funds with different portfolio strategies. If there was a new portfolio 
                                                          
 
11
 Fidelity Growth Company, Fidelity Low Priced Stock, Fidelity Magellan Fund, Fidelity 
Contrafund, Fidelity Diversified International Fund. 
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allocation type that was becoming fashionable, Fidelity would create a fund of that type. 
Fidelity’s new funds enjoyed advantages in distribution, marketing, and name recognition 
compared to similar funds from smaller management companies. These advantages were by and 
large not enough to make the new funds dominant in terms of assets under management 
compared to similar competitors, however. Occasionally, by luck or skill, a Fidelity fund would 
become dominant. If the Fidelity fund was dominant as the new fund type became very 
fashionable, and many similar competitors entered the market, the Fidelity fund would become 
durably dominant. This provided Fidelity with further resources to establish new exploratory 
funds, thus increasing its chances of having yet another dominant fund. 
This explanation is empirically testable with the current data. Additional data from 
Fidelity and other mutual fund management company’s prospectuses could provide information 
on strategic intent. If this explanation holds, then the observed durable dominance of mutual fund 
management companies is explained by the durable dominance of individual mutual funds—
which I have sought to explain in this chapter. 
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 3.1: Predicted Non-Linear Effect of New Competitive Entry on Flow of Assets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bars in Panel C illustrate the predictions of Hypothesis 1. Increased competitive entry is 
predicted to have a non-linear effect on future flows of assets. Only the largest funds (in relative 
size of assets under management compared to competitors) will benefit. 
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Figure 3.2: The Non-Linear Effect of New Competitive Entry on Flow of Assets 
 
 
 
Bars and left axis indicate the predicted effect (in millions of dollars) of a unit increase in new 
entrant overlap on the focal fund’s flow in the next 12 months. Line and right axis show the 
percentage of fund-quarter observations within each size ratio bin. See Table 3.3 and chapter text 
for details of the binning. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 3.1: Data Descriptions 
 
Variable Description 
Flow of assets next 12 
months 
The net flow of investments into the focal fund over the next 12 months, 
calculated as the net growth in fund assets beyond reinvested dividends 
and asset influx from mergers (cf. Sirri and Tufano, 1998). Flows for 
four quarters were summed to create twelve month trailing measures. 
Dominant in year+n A dichotomous variable that equals 1 if Dominant fund in year+n, where 
n = 1, 2, 4, 5. See below for definition of Dominant fund. 
Flow of assets 
previous 12 months 
The net flow of investments into the focal fund over the previous 12 
months. See Flow of assets next 12 months above for measure details. 
Flow of assets into 
similar funds 
Cosine similarity-weighted average of flows into similar funds. Flow 
into the focal fund is included in the sum. 
Standardized return The focal fund’s z-score (across all funds present in each time period) of 
12-month fund returns from CRSP. 
Standard deviation of 
returns 
The standard deviation of the focal fund’s past 12 months’ monthly 
returns from CRSP. 
Logged total net 
assets 
The base 10 log of the total net assets of the fund from CRSP. 
Logged age The base 10 log of the age of the fund in months from CRSP. 
Expense ratio The fund’s expense ratio from CRSP. 
Turnover ratio The fund’s turnover ratio from CRSP. 
Logged management 
company size 
The base 10 log of the total net assets of the fund’s management 
company. The management company code from the Thomson database 
was used to determine a fund’s management company. 
New entrant overlap The sum of pair-wise cosine similarities for the focal fund across all new 
entrants. 
Size ratio The ratio of the focal fund’s total net assets to the cosine similarity-
weighted average of its competitors’ total net assets. 
Dominant fund A dichotomous variable that equals 1 when the focal fund’s size ratio is 
greater than ten. Dominant fund = 1 for 1,212 observations (1.04% of 
total observations). Seventy-six funds are dominant in one or more time 
periods. I also use the z-score of the size ratio across contemporary 
funds as an alternate measure of dominance. 
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Table 3.2: The Effect of New Competitive Entry on Flow of Assets 
 
Fixed effect panel regressions.  
Dependent variable: Flow of assets next 12 months Model 1 Model 2 
Flow of assets previous 12 months 0.492*** 0.505*** 
 
(146.08) (149.67) 
Flow of assets into similar funds 0.000 0.001*** 
 
(1.79) (3.69) 
Standardized return 32.259*** 32.495*** 
 
(14.54) (14.74) 
Standard deviation of returns 203.890* 204.606* 
 
(1.99) (1.99) 
Logged total net assets -208.898*** -309.718*** 
 
(-28.10) (-25.12) 
Logged age 64.487*** 110.854*** 
 
(5.04) (8.27) 
Expense ratio 210.049 69.682 
 
(0.43) (0.14) 
Turnover ratio -1.024 -1.179 
 
(-0.57) (-0.66) 
Logged management company size 9.583 17.224** 
 
(1.81) (3.26) 
New entrant overlap -3.852*** -4.969*** 
 
(-4.46) (-3.53) 
(Standard deviation of returns) × (New entrant overlap) 10.207*** 9.591*** 
 
(11.72) (11.01) 
Dominant fund -1048.696*** 
 
 
(-30.86) 
 (Dominant fund) × (New entrant overlap) 70.090*** 
 
 
(16.07) 
 Bin 1 
 
-489.447*** 
  
(-10.67) 
Bin 2 
 
-378.420*** 
  
(-13.93) 
Bin 3 
 
-280.731*** 
  
(-14.65) 
Bin 4 
 
-188.921*** 
  
(-13.90) 
Bin 5 
 
-93.193*** 
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(-10.16) 
Bin 6 
 
(omitted) 
  Bin 7 
 
66.418*** 
  
(7.53) 
Bin 8 
 
65.410*** 
  
(5.19) 
Bin 9 
 
-88.697*** 
  
(-4.90) 
Bin 10 
 
-518.626*** 
  
(-18.69) 
Bin 11 
 
-1501.781*** 
  
(-32.13) 
(Bin 1) × (New entrant overlap) 
 
5.207 
  
(0.27) 
(Bin 2) × (New entrant overlap) 
 
-2.634 
  
(-0.38) 
(Bin 3) × (New entrant overlap) 
 
-1.526 
  
(-0.38) 
(Bin 4) × (New entrant overlap) 
 
0.425 
  
(0.15) 
(Bin 5) × (New entrant overlap) 
 
-0.029 
  
(-0.01) 
(Bin 6) × (New entrant overlap) 
 
(omitted) 
  (Bin 7) × (New entrant overlap) 
 
0.885 
  
(0.46) 
(Bin 8) × (New entrant overlap)  0.813 
 
 (0.40) 
(Bin 9) × (New entrant overlap) 
 
3.711 
  
(1.64) 
(Bin 10) × (New entrant overlap) 
 
25.645*** 
  
(7.27) 
(Bin 11) × (New entrant overlap) 
 
72.114*** 
  
(15.26) 
Constant 333.164*** 511.850*** 
 
(11.18) (15.57) 
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Table 3.3: Binning on Standardized Size Ratios 
 
Bin 
number Z-score range 
% of 
observations 
1 < -2.25 1.52% 
2 -1.75 - -2.25 3.00% 
3 -1.25 - -1.75 6.41% 
4 -0.75 - -1.25 11.70% 
5 -0.25 - -0.75 16.30% 
6 -0.25 - 0.25 18.93% 
7 0.25 - 0.75 17.94% 
8 0.75 - 1.25 14.35% 
9 1.25 - 1.75 6.37% 
10 1.75 - 2.25 2.19% 
11 > 2.25 1.29% 
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Table 3.4: Effect of New Competitive Entry on Log-Odds of Being Dominant in N Years 
 
Fixed effect panel logistic regressions.  
Dependent variable:  
Dominant in year+n Year + 1 Year + 2 Year +3 Year + 5 
Flow of assets previous 12 months 0.000* 0.000*** 0.000* -0.000 
 
(2.50) (3.52) (2.36) (-0.47) 
Flow of assets into similar funds 0.000* 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
(2.01) (4.55) (4.14) (7.85) 
Standardized return 0.332** 0.411*** 0.375*** 0.528*** 
 
(3.23) (3.91) (3.56) (3.51) 
Standard deviation of returns -4.573 -19.837*** -22.034*** 13.269* 
 
(-1.20) (-4.53) (-4.74) (2.09) 
Logged total net assets 2.471*** 1.873*** 0.307 -4.850*** 
 
(4.51) (3.79) (0.66) (-6.05) 
Logged age -7.524*** -8.965*** -10.225*** -7.792*** 
 
(-6.89) (-7.69) (-8.30) (-4.42) 
Expense ratio 57.236 250.625** 209.917* 395.607** 
 
(0.61) (2.63) (2.18) (2.81) 
Turnover ratio -0.536 -0.351 -0.351 -0.845 
 
(-1.59) (-0.96) (-0.92) (-1.57) 
Logged management company size -0.728* -0.723* -1.015** -2.623*** 
 
(-2.03) (-2.02) (-2.78) (-5.11) 
New entrant overlap -0.007 0.026 -0.029 -0.042 
 
(-0.26) (0.77) (-0.93) (-1.05) 
Size ratio 0.046* 0.033* 0.034* 0.067** 
 
(2.49) (2.07) (2.20) (2.91) 
Dominant fund 1.311*** 0.206 -0.047 -0.060 
 
(6.82) (1.00) (-0.22) (-0.18) 
(Dominant fund) x (New entrant overlap) -0.012 0.034 0.114** 0.264*** 
 
(-0.44) (0.81) (2.75) (4.97) 
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Chapter 4:  
The De-Cohesion of the U.S. Corporate Interlock Network, 1997-2010: 
Disappearance of Matthew Effect Prevents Non-Dominants from Attaining Dominance
12
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The model of Chapter 2 predicts that a disappearance of rich-get-richer Matthew effects 
will prevent non-dominants from rising to dominance. In this chapter, I test this prediction in the 
sociologically-important context of board appointments at S&P 1500 companies. I present data 
showing the disappearance of a Matthew effect for board appointments in the early 2000s: 
Directors on multiple boards were more likely to gain additional board seats before 2000, but lost 
this advantage by 2010. As predicted, this change prevented non-dominant directors from rising 
to dominance (i.e., gaining many board seats). 
Straightforward application of the model predicts that the dearth of newly-dominant 
directors should lead to entrenchment of existing dominant directors. In this setting, however, 
exogenous factors forced dominants to leave the population—the most dominant directors grew 
old and retired from board service during the period under study. This chapter’s findings thus 
shed light on a special case of the theory: What happens when processes of durable dominance 
                                                          
 
12
 This chapter draws extensively from Chu and Davis (2013), which we are currently revising 
for second-round submission to a sociology journal. Much of the data and analysis is shared 
between the draft article and this chapter. Some of the text is also repeated from the draft article. 
I have tried to reuse only passages that I initially penned, either for the draft article or for my 
second-year paper on which the article builds. 
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operate, but the dominant disappear? (This would be equivalent to asking what would happen if 
the largest mutual funds were terminated by legislative decree in the setting of the previous 
chapter.) Throughout the twentieth century, a few dominant directors each served on many U.S. 
corporate boards. The identity of the dominant directors changed as older directors retired and 
new directors rose to dominance. This ever-renewed “inner circle” of many-board directors made 
the U.S. corporate interlock network (the network of companies linked by shared directors) 
strikingly cohesive. I find the inner circle disappeared by 2010. The retirement of dominant 
directors coupled with the non-appearance of new dominant directors destroyed the century-long 
cohesiveness of the U.S. interlock network. The chapter closes by asking what the disappearance 
of the inner circle implies for our understanding of elites in the United States. 
 
4.2 The U.S. Corporate Interlock Network in the Twentieth Century 
From Louis Brandeis (1914) and Vladimir Lenin ([1916] 1939) to C. Wright Mills (1956) 
and Michael Useem, observers of society have accorded great power to a small “inner circle” 
(Useem, 1984) of corporate directors who serve on multiple corporate boards and “often seem to 
know one another, seem quite naturally to work together, and share many organizations in 
common” (Mills, 1956: 294). Structurally, this inner circle was the glue that made the American 
corporate board interlock network a “small world” (Davis, Yoo, and Baker, 2003), where the 
most-connected directors were friends or friends of friends of the majority of all large company 
directors in America and the most-central companies were less than three steps away from the 
majority of all large companies. This network is the substrate through which corporate practices 
diffuse (Davis, 1991), political action is shaped (Mizruchi, 1989; 1992), and a class-
consciousness is created (Useem, 1984). (See Mizruchi, 1996, for an early review on the 
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functions of interlocks.) Since its rise in the early twentieth century, the board interlock network 
has been written and theorized about perhaps more extensively than any other social network 
(e.g., Mintz and Schwartz, 1985; Stokman, Ziegler, and Scott, 1985; Scott, 1997; Davis and 
Mizruchi, 1999; Windolf, 2002; Kogut, 2012). 
The interlock network was not only a symptom of elite cohesion, but also an important 
instrument in screening and socializing new members of the corporate elite and creating a 
political consensus among them (Useem, 1984; Mizruchi, 1992). Board meetings gave new 
directors exposure to powerful “corporate diplomats” (Useem, 1984) who (if the newcomers met 
their approval) could introduce the less-connected to other influential elite members and provide 
sponsorship leading to political appointments and further board appointments. This feedback 
loop from consequence (interlock network cohesiveness) to cause (elite cohesiveness) suggests a 
functional force (Stinchcombe, 1968: Chapter 3-II) acting to maintain the cohesion of the 
interlock network. Dips in local interlock network connectedness would inconvenience elites 
who used board meetings for intelligence gathering and social connection, leading them to seek 
out new board memberships for themselves or to have well-connected individuals appointed to 
the boards they served on. 
Indeed, the cohesion of the interlock network was remarkably stable. Mizruchi (1982) 
found that the percentage of large companies that could be reached in three network steps from 
the most-central company (“three-step reach”) was 90.9% in 1904 and stayed above 80% past 
1974 (the end of his study period). The cohesiveness of the network was maintained even as the 
network transitioned from being dominated by “robber barons” in 1912 to being 
institutionalized—not person- but company-centric—from 1935 onward. During the transition 
from robber barons to institutions, the three-step network size remained roughly constant, even 
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while the number of directors serving on six or more boards and the density (proportion of 
possible connections realized) of the network declined precipitously. 
This cohesiveness persisted to the end of the twentieth century, with Chase Manhattan in 
1999 being three or fewer steps away from 82.4% of the 811 companies in Davis et al.’s (2003) 
study. Davis et al. found that “in spite of the rampant turnover among boards and directors, and 
nearly complete turnover in ties, distances among the corporate elite remained virtually 
constant.” (2003: 321). Their finding was even more striking in that during the period covered in 
their study—1982 to 2001—two other long-standing features of the network changed 
completely: Banks were ousted from their 80-year reign as the most central companies in the 
interlock network, and the demographic composition of the inner circle changed from all-white 
and all-male to one where the most-connected directors tended to be African-American and/or 
female. But mean geodesics—the average number of steps between any two companies—among 
the largest companies remained small and near-constant: 3.38 in 1982, 3.46 in 1990, and 3.46 in 
1999. Davis et al. concluded that a small network diameter was an “emergent propert[y] of 
networks qua networks” (2003: 322). 
 
4.3 The Matthew Effect in Board Appointments 
The enduring cohesion of the interlock network can be explained by the continued 
existence of dominant directors—those with disproportionately more board seats than the 
average director. Dominant directors create many ties. Vernon Jordan sat on nine corporate 
boards in 1999 with 106 other directors, for example. A basic finding of network theory is that 
the existence of a few nodes with many ties (dominant directors in this setting) shortens overall 
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path lengths in the network (Watts and Strogatz, 1998; Barabási and Albert, 1999; Bianconi and 
Barabási, 2001). 
Two factors advantaged a director who sat on many boards in being hired onto yet more 
boards. First, a director on many boards (e.g., Vernon Jordan) had many co-directors, who were 
likely to collectively sit on many other boards, which increased the focal director’s chances of 
being recommended to a new board. Second, sitting on many boards increased the value of a 
director for other boards. Useem (1984) argued that directors sitting on many boards gained 
broad-based business intelligence, social connections, and legitimacy within the corporate and 
political worlds, thus making them attractive as co-directors. Others have suggested that well-
connected directors brought mainly symbolic status benefits to the companies on whose boards 
they served. For example, writing after the Penn Central bankruptcy in 1970, Myles Mace 
compared directors to “ornaments on the corporate Christmas tree” (1971: 90) and Davis and 
Robbins showed that “directors who serve on many outside boards—particularly boards of 
prestigious firms—make better ornaments” (2005: 290-291). Directors gained prestige by being 
on many and prestigious boards, and boards gained prestige by hosting prestigious directors. A 
rich-get-richer dynamic prevailed. 
Demography was also a factor in board hiring, with preferences for certain demographic 
groups shifting over time. Directors were predominantly white (usually “well-bred” Protestant) 
males until the 1980s. Women and minorities started to be sought after to bolster companies’ 
claims to diversity during the 1990s. Another basis for hiring was skill. Fama and Jensen (1983) 
argued that directors who were good stewards of shareholder value would be invited onto more 
boards, and several studies (e.g., Yermack, 2004) have found that directors of firms with good 
performance tended to join more boards. There are other types of skill, however. Westphal and 
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colleagues (Westphal and Stern, 2007; Zajac and Westphal, 1996) have shown that being skilled 
at ingratiation and having a reputation for not actively monitoring CEO actions led to more board 
appointments. 
The long-standing preference for directors on many boards may have changed after the 
corporate scandals of the early 2000s. During the twentieth century, a company gained prestige if 
it managed to attract a sought-after (i.e., already on many boards) director to its own board 
(Useem, 1984; Davis and Robbins, 2005). After the corporate scandals of the early 2000s, 
however, hiring a board member sitting on many other boards may have become regarded as 
risky for two reasons. First, the director’s affiliations would taint the focal firm’s reputation if 
one of the affiliated companies should become embroiled in scandal (cf. Bothner, Smith, and 
White, 2010). Second, directors on many boards became regarded as “overworked”13 or “busy” 
(e.g., Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard, 2003; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). “Overboarded” 
directors were identified as corporate governance risk factors by the influential advisory firm, 
Institutional Shareholder Services in 2004. ISS now recommends that institutional investors 
withhold votes for directors who serve on more than six public company boards
14
.  
The models of Chapter 2 suggest that non-dominant directors would be prevented from 
becoming dominant if the negative shift in the perception of dominant directors led to a change 
in hiring patterns, such that directors with many board seats stopped being preferentially-hired 
compared to those with one board seat. The non-dominant (in number of board seats) directors 
                                                          
 
13
 E.g., Forbes. 2002. America’s most overworked directors. 
14
 The current policy is available at 
http://www.issgovernance.com/files/2013USPolicyUpdates.pdf on page 8. 
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would find it difficult to rise to dominance (many board seats) after the breakdown of 
preferential attachment. 
 
4.4 Data 
To capture shifts in the micro-dynamics of board hiring, I created a dataset covering S&P 
1500 boards from 1997 to 2010, using data from RiskMetrics, Boardex, and CRSP/Compustat. 
Annual board composition data were created using board data from RiskMetrics and interlock 
data from Boardex. While the RiskMetrics dataset is the one most commonly used in studies of 
board interlocks, it suffers from issues of data quality. Names are listed inconsistently, different 
people with the same name or similar names are sometimes indicated as being the same person, 
and the same person is often listed using several “unique” identifiers. The Boardex dataset uses 
company and director unique identifiers consistently. (During data processing, I found only one 
instance of an identifier being used inconsistently in Boardex, compared to thousands of 
inconsistencies in RiskMetrics.) Boardex has its own weaknesses, however. The data coverage is 
incomplete for firms and individuals that were not active into the late 2000s and Boardex 
sometimes splits one company into two entries. 
I corrected RiskMetrics company and director identifiers by matching them to Boardex 
identifiers, using text similarity matching for company and director names, director board lists 
and company director lists, and pattern-matching for interlocks. I created algorithms to 
automatically generate suggested corrections to RiskMetrics data based on linked Boardex data. 
Suggested corrections were manually checked before being reflected in the final dataset. 
Using this corrected data set, I created the list of companies that were on the S&P 1500 as 
of their annual meeting date according to RiskMetrics, and generated the corresponding lists of 
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board members. Finally, I added annual performance data from CRSP/Compustat, matching 
entries on CUSIPs and ticker symbols. The S&P 1500 sample includes 2,454 distinct companies 
and 17,065 company-years, and 27,192 directors and 151,135 director-years. From these lists of 
companies and boards, I created lists of annual board interlocks (companies sharing a director) 
and director interlocks (directors serving together on the same board). The sample consisted of 
54,220 corporate interlock-years for an average of slightly under 3,900 interlocks per year, and 
882,120 director interlock-years for an average of slightly over 63,000 interlocks per year. 
I examined over-time changes in whether directors on more boards were more likely than 
directors on one board to gain another board seat in the subsequent year, controlling for other 
network, demographic, and skill factors. Demographically, I tracked whether directors were 
female, members of an ethnic minority, members of the social elite (defined as non-minority men 
educated at Harvard, Yale, Princeton, or Stanford). I also tracked whether each director was a 
corporate executive for each year of the study period. I collected director-year measures of the 
size (logged number of employees) and annual performance (total annual returns) of the 
companies on whose boards each director served. For each director, I used the maximal value of 
each size and performance measure in the regressions
15
. I also created four network measures for 
each director for each year in our study period. Using the director-director network of directors 
linked by common board memberships, I measured each director’s degree centrality (how many 
different directors does the focal director sit on boards with) and eigenvector centrality. The 
                                                          
 
15
 Exploratory regressions showed that the maximal values of these measures explained more of 
the variance in subsequent director hiring than means or medians. Using means or medians 
instead yields the same significant regression results. Alternate specifications used logged market 
value for size and return on assets or return on equity for performance. The empirical 
conclusions below were unaffected by these substitutions. 
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latter measure is a recursive indicator of the focal director’s status in the overall director-director 
network. Directors who are linked to many well-linked directors rank higher in eigenvector 
centrality. I also created a measure of the number of boards that each director could be 
introduced to by his peer directors. For each director, I counted the number of different boards 
served on by directors who sat on the same board as the focal director, then subtracted the boards 
where the focal director already served. The final and focal network measure was the number of 
board seats held by the director. In addition to these measures, I also tracked directors’ ages and 
used age and age-squared as controls in the regressions. Regressions also controlled for years 
since the first year in the dataset, and individual year effects. Table 4.1 contains details of how I 
constructed each measure from the data sources. Table 4.2 shows descriptive statistics and 
correlations
16
. 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4.1 about here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4.2 about here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
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 For obvious reasons, director degree centrality was highly correlated with both the number of 
board seats held by the director and the number of boards peer directors sit on. Removing 
director degree centrality from the analysis did not change the pattern of results for the remaining 
variables. 
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4.5 The Breakdown of Preferential Attachment 
Models 1-3 in Table 4.3 show regression results from a random-effects unbalanced panel 
logistic regression calculating the effects of each independent variable on the probability of a 
director gaining a new board seat in the subsequent year. To capture monotonous changes in the 
effect of each independent variable over the years, I included the interaction terms of each 
independent variable with the number of years since 1997 (the first year in our data).  
Model 1 shows results from the full model. Examining the effects of control variables 
shows that directors associated with larger companies were more likely to gain new board seats, 
but there was no effect for directors on the boards of higher performance companies, when 
controlling for demographic and network characteristics. Note the comparison with Models 2 
and 3, which show regression results without network measure regressors. Directors from more 
successful companies were not preferred per se, but may have been popular with board selection 
committees only because they had good network connections. 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4.3 about here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Minority directors and social elite directors were preferentially hired onto additional 
boards throughout the period of the study. Minority directors were 1.47 times more likely than 
non-minority directors, and social elite directors 1.36 times more likely than non-elite directors, 
to gain an additional board seat in the next year. There was no significant preference for female 
directors, however. Corporate executives were initially less likely than non-executives to gain 
additional board seats, but this trend shifted over time. I examine this shift in more detail below. 
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Directors who sat on boards with others who sat on many other boards were more likely 
to gain additional board seats. Each additional board a peer served on increased the likelihood of 
the focal director gaining a new board seat by a factor of 1.034. A director whose board 
colleagues served on ten other boards was predicted to be 40% more likely to gain a new board 
seat in the next year than a director whose colleagues did not sit on any other non-overlapping 
boards. Note that when controlling for peer board reach and other network characteristics, 
increasing the number of co-directors negatively impacted the propensity to gain additional 
board seats. This is in line with social network research finding that the range and content of 
connections trumps sheer number of connections in determining outcomes for the focal actor 
(e.g., Burt, 1992; Cotton-Nessler, 2013). 
The Matthew effect for board seats was evident in 1997 but disappeared by 2010. In 1997, 
directors who sat on two boards were approximately twice as likely to gain additional board seats 
as those who sat on only one board, and the same held true for directors on three or more boards. 
This preference for directors on many boards disappeared during the period of the study, 
however.  
To examine this change and the change in preferential hiring of corporate executives in 
more detail, I repeated the regression above, but substituted interactions with year dummies 
instead of with years since 1997 for the measures of corporate executive status and number of 
boards. This allowed the calculation of coefficients for corporate executive status and number of 
boards for each year in the study period. To do this, I took the coefficient vector from the 
regression results and added the coefficient of the interaction term of the independent variable 
with the year to the base year (1997) coefficient for the independent variable. I also calculated 
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variances for each of these coefficients by using the covariance matrix with the sum formula for 
variances: 
 
VARIANCE(a1 + a2) = VARIANCE(a1) + VARIANCE(a2) + 2 × COV(a1, a2) 
 
Three separate variance-weighted least-squares regressions confirm the overall shift in 
the values of these coefficients over the period of the study. Directors on multiple boards became 
comparatively less likely to gain additional board seats over time (directors on two boards: t =  
-4.38, p < 0.0005; on three or more boards: t = -4.36, p < 0.0005), and corporate executives 
became comparatively more likely to gain new board appointments (t = 2.27, p = 0.023).  
Using the yearly coefficients obtained above, Figure 4.1 plots the odds-ratios of joining a 
new board in the subsequent year for directors with multiple board seats compared to those with 
one board seat for each year from 1997 to 2009. The variance-weighted least-squares models 
predict that a director with two board seats in 1997 was 1.85 times more likely than a director 
with only one board seat to join a new board within the next year, but only 1.08 times more 
likely in 2009. The predicted change in log-odds for directors on three or more boards was even 
more drastic. A director on three or more boards was 2.00 times more likely than a director on 
one board to join a new board within the next year, but became only 0.87 times as likely as a 
one-board director in 2009. This shift in preference for three or more board directors appears to 
have occurred abruptly between 2002 and 2003 (see Figure 4.1 right panel). 
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---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4.1 about here 
----------------------------------------------------  
Figure 4.2 shows the trend shift for corporate executives. By 2009, corporate executives 
were predicted to be 1.32 times more likely than non-executives to gain a new board seat in the 
subsequent year. Corporate executives became increasingly more preferred, perhaps starting a 
reverse to the trend of non-executive directors dominating the inner circle. 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4.2 about here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
 
4.6 The Dog That Did Not Bark: The Non-Appearance of New Dominant Directors 
The previous section established the breakdown of preferential attachment. By 2010, 
directors with many board seats no longer enjoyed a Matthew effect and competed equally with 
those with only one board seat for further board appointments. The model from Chapter 2 
suggests that such a change in competitive dynamics should make it more difficult for non-
dominants to become dominant. Below, I examine whether this prediction holds: Did the 
disappearance of preferential attachment lead to the non-appearance of new dominant directors?  
During the five years from 1998 to 2012, over a hundred directors each accrued four or 
more board seats (see black diamonds in Figure 4.3), with Shirley Ann Jackson (the president of 
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Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute) garnering ten different board appointments
17
 within this period, 
and remaining on eight of these boards in 2002. By contrast, only 25 directors took four or more 
new board appointments during the period from 2006 to 2010 (see red triangles in Figure 4.3), 
with four directors collecting five new board appointments. Of these four directors, one (John 
Malone, the billionaire ex-CEO of TCI) remained on four boards at the end of the period, with 
two remaining on one board and one on none. Accruing many board seats became much less 
likely after the early 2000s. 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4.3 about here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
To test whether the disappearance of rich-get-richer effects could cause such a shift, I 
created a Monte Carlo simulation. The simulation starts with the S&P 1500 board composition of 
1997. I created unique identifiers for each seat on each company’s board, and created a history 
for each board seat using the S&P 1500 data described in Section 4. If a director resigned from a 
board in the S&P 1500 data, the corresponding seat was removed from the simulation. If a new 
director was hired, a new seat was created. If the hired director was new to S&P 1500 board 
service (i.e., had no prior board appointments), I created a new data entry for the director in the 
simulation and assigned that director to the new seat. On the other hand, if the director already 
existed in the system, I randomly assigned a new director to the seat from the set of directors 
                                                          
 
17
 Sealed Air, Fedex, and Utiliticorp in 2000, Newport News Shipbuilding and USX-Marathon in 
2001, AT&T, Keycorp, Medtronic, Public Service Enterprise Group, and U.S. Steel in 2002. She 
kept her seat on Marathon Oil’s board as well as joining U.S. Steel’s board when USX-Marathon 
divested U.S. Steel in 2002. Jackson remained on four of these boards (Medtronic, Public 
Service Enterprise Group, Fedex, Marathon Oil) until the end of this study’s data coverage in 
2010, at which time she also served on the board of IBM. 
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existing in the system. Each director was assigned odds of gaining a new board seat according to 
his or her characteristics and the rules of the simulation scenario. 
Figure 4.4 shows results of the simulation with 1,200 trials for each of two scenarios. In 
Scenario 1, directors with two board seats were given 1.85 times better odds than directors with 
one board seat of being hired for an open board seat. Directors with three or more board seats 
were given 2.00 times better odds. (These odds ratios are those predicted for 1997 by the 
variation-weighted least-squares regressions described in the previous section.) The odds ratios 
were held constant throughout the period simulated from 1997 to 2010. This scenario thus 
models a counterfactual where preferential attachment was constant throughout the period of 
study. No other factors were considered in calculating the odds of gaining a new board seat in 
this scenario. Scenario 2 used the same parameters, with one key difference: The Matthew effect 
was eliminated after 2002. All directors were assigned the same odds of gaining a newly-created 
board seat from 2003 until the end of the simulated period. 
The black lines in Figure 4.4 delineate 95-percentile values (2.5% of observations fall 
below the bottom line and 2.5% above the top) of the number of directors gaining one, two, three, 
four, five, and six boards in Scenario 1 from 2006 to 2010 inclusive. The red lines delineate the 
same 95-percentile range for Scenario 2. The change in micro-dynamics from Scenario 1 to 
Scenario 2 resulted in a dramatically lower number of directors gaining four or more board seats 
from 2006 to 2010. The disappearance of the Matthew effect made it more difficult for non-
dominants to become dominant. 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4.4 about here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
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The disappearance of the Matthew effect also decreased the number of dominant 
directors at the end of the simulated period. Figure 4.5 shows 95-percentile ranges from the 
simulation for the distribution of number of directors by number of board seats in 2010. The 
number of directors with four or more board seats was significantly lower for Scenario 2 
compared to Scenario 1, and the number of directors with five board seats was an order of 
magnitude smaller. 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4.5 about here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
This effect was also observed in the historical S&P 1500 data. The most-dominant 
directors disappeared from the interlock network by 2010. In 2000, 17 directors each sat on six 
or more S&P 1500 boards (Vernon Jordan was on nine) and 44 sat on five. By 2010, no directors 
sat on six or more boards and only 11 sat on five (see Figure 4.6). Unlike the companies in the 
model of Chapter 2 or the mutual funds of Chapter 3, dominant directors were not entrenched.  
---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4.6 about here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
An examination of the demographic characteristics of dominants in 2000 explains this 
divergent outcome. Dominant directors in the interlock network differed from the companies 
modeled in Chapter 2 and the mutual funds described in Chapter 3 in one critical way—they 
retired. The median age for directors on six or more boards in 2000 was five years higher (64) 
than the median age for all directors, and almost all of the most-dominant directors in 1997 
retired from board service by 2010. Figure 4.7 plots the age of directors with six or more board 
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seats in 2001 versus the net number of board seats each of these directors lost over the next eight 
years, and shows a strong linear relationship (t = 4.76, p = 0.001). 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4.7 about here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
This setting thus provides insight into a useful special case for the theory, where non-
dominants can no longer rise to dominance, but the dominant fall from dominance. The 
disappearance of  dominants changes the structure of the system. Below, I explore the 
consequences of a world without network dominants. 
 
4.7 The Interlock Network without Dominant Directors 
The disappearance of dominant directors caused a decrease in the connectedness 
distributions of boards and directors. Figure 4.8 shows the degree distribution for companies in 
the S&P 1500 corporate interlock network in 2000 and 2010. The average degree decreased from 
7.14 in 2000 to 4.98 in 2010. There were 62 companies with more than 20 direct board ties 
(shared directors) to other companies in 2000 with Sara Lee and Allstate having 37 direct ties 
each. By 2010, only one company with more than 20 direct ties remained—Marathon Oil with 
only 21. (See Table 4.4 for a list of the most-connected companies and their number of shared-
director ties to other companies in 2000 and 2010.)  
---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4.4 about here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
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---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4.8 about here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
The average degree for directors (number of directors sharing boards with the focal 
director) declined from 12.32 to 10.95, a smaller drop as the modal director sat on one board 
with eight to ten other directors. The connectedness of the most-connected directors decreased 
dramatically, however. In 2000, Vernon Jordan sat on the same boards with 101 different S&P 
1500 directors. By 2010, the most-connected director (Sam Nunn) had only 53 direct ties. (See 
Table 4.5 for a list of the most-connected directors and their number of same-board ties to other 
directors in 2000 and 2010.) In 2000, 71 directors had more than 50 direct ties; by 2010 only five 
directors had more than 50 ties (Figure 4.9). 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4.5 about here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4.9 about here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
The decreased number of direct ties from companies to companies, and changes in the 
distribution of ties, led to a structural change in the interlock network. Figure 4.10 shows the 
main component of the S&P 500 interlock network in 1996 and 2010. While the main 
component still spanned most of the companies in the S&P 500 in 2010, the network as a whole 
had become noticeably less densely-connected.  
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---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4.10 about here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
This drop in connectedness resulted in increased path lengths between companies. Figure 
4.11 shows mean geodesics in the main component of the corporate interlock network 
connecting the largest U.S. public companies. Average network distances stayed near constant 
between 1982 and 1999 (Davis et al., 2003), but increased sharply from 2000 to 2010 (this study). 
The average distance between two companies in the main component of the S&P 500 corporate 
interlock network increased from 3.21 in 2000 to 4.23 in 2010, while the S&P 1500 mean 
geodesic increased from 4.16 to 4.97 during the same period. Table 4.6 lists the sizes of the 
maximal three-step networks in the large U.S. public company network for selected years from 
1904 to 2010. Like the most-central companies over the previous 100 years, the company with 
the largest three-step network in 2000 (Sara Lee) had board ties linking it to over 80% of S&P 
500 boards in three steps, and none of the 425 S&P 500 main component companies were more 
than five steps away from Sara Lee on the corporate interlock network. By contrast, in 2010 
United Technologies Company had the largest three-step network, but had barely more than 60% 
of S&P 500 boards linked within three steps, and it required eight steps to reach all companies in 
the main component from United Technologies. 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4.11 about here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
62 
 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4.6 about here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
 
4.8 Discussion 
As predicted, the disappearance of the Matthew effect in board appointments prevented 
the appearance of new dominant directors. The U.S. board interlock network’s inner circle of 
dominant (many board) directors was replenished throughout the twentieth century by a rich-get-
richer Matthew effect for board seats. Directors on more than one board had an advantage over 
directors on one board in gaining further board appointments. I find that this advantage 
disappeared in the early 2000s. The leveling of the playing field for further board appointments 
prevented the appearance of new dominant directors. 
The findings of this chapter present an important special case for the theory of durable 
dominance. Unlike dominant mutual funds, which remained dominant for long periods of time, 
dominant directors could not maintain their dominance. They grew old and retired from board 
service. The inner circle of dominant directors disappeared, and the macro-structure of the 
interlock network changed in striking—and historically unprecedented—ways. There is no 
longer a cohesive network of corporate board directors in the United States. 
The United States without a Broad-Based Cohesive Corporate Elite 
Where did the elite who previously congregated on the interlock network go? Does a 
cohesive elite still exist in the United States? Mizruchi (2013) asserts that a moderate, highly-
connected and influential core of business leaders—the corporate elite—continually existed from 
the early twentieth century, but disappeared in the 1990s. In his view, an “active state, powerful 
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labor, and a financial community whose interests transcended those of particular firms or 
sectors” forced the corporate elite to unite and defend the corporate system. In the 1980s, the 
moderating influences of the state, labor and commercial banks were weakened, and instead 
“shareholder value” became the dominant logic (Zajac and Westphal, 2004). Institutional 
investors (Useem, 1996), financial analysts (Dobbin and Zorn, 2005) and the capital market itself 
(Davis, 2009) came to exert control on CEOs and directors. On one hand, the corporate elite had 
won the war, and the U.S. corporate system had become a taken-for-granted institution, an 
ideological tautology. Attempts by lenders, labor, or government to place restrictions on 
corporations were now deemed ill-advised, even unpatriotic. On the other hand, the new 
shareholder value master proved to be a tyrant. Public company CEOs lost job security, and 
found themselves scrambling to survive individually by capturing more market value for their 
individual firms. The corporate elite no longer had the motivation nor the ability to band together 
to defend their interests as a class. If there is no longer a cohesive elite in the United States, we 
are left with a puzzle: What maintains the large and growing gap between the wealthiest (often 
owners and managers of large corporations) in U.S. society and everyone else (cf. Chu and 
Mizruchi, in press)? 
One possibility is that the elite have found new, more hospitable enclaves, protected from 
non-elite entry and hidden from public scrutiny. Davis (2013) suggests that public corporations 
are losing their central place in the American economy, finding that the number of listed 
companies in the U.S. dropped by more than half between 1997 and 2012, as the number of de-
listings consistently outpaced the number of companies going public. Moreover, companies 
going public recently have adopted market-hostile governance structures, giving their founders 
super-voting rights that ensure their control. (The three founders of Groupon, for instance, hold 
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stakes giving them 150 votes per share; Mark Zuckerberg personally controls an absolute 
majority of Facebook’s voting rights.) It is possible that the public corporation as we know it is 
an artifact of the twentieth century, and thus those who control corporations are no longer 
society’s elites. 
Another, non-exclusive possibility is that a smaller, still cohesive, and powerful corporate 
elite still exists, bound together by board, business, and social links. Members of this elite may 
no longer sit on many boards, but are still individually powerful and connected to powerful 
others. This elite group may no longer be tied to the broad interests of business, however, and 
instead be primarily concerned with the welfare of a much smaller segment of society. The 
disappearance of a climbable ladder into the inner circle for new directors isolates this smaller 
elite group, and prevents circulation into this elite from the broader pool of corporate directors. 
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 4.1: 
Odds-Ratios for Multiple-Board Directors of Gaining a New Board Appointment 
 
 
 
The points are the observed odds-ratios for multiple-board directors compared to directors on 
one board of gaining a new board seat in the next year for each year, the error bars are standard 
errors in these odds-ratios, and the lines are predictions of a variance-weighted least squares 
regression. The y-axis is log-scaled. 
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Figure 4.2: 
Odds-Ratios for Corporate Executive Directors of Gaining a New Board Appointment 
 
 
 
The points are the observed odds-ratios for corporate executive directors compared to non-
executive directors gaining a new board seat in the next year for each year, the error bars are 
standard errors in these odds-ratios, and the lines are predictions of a variance-weighted least 
squares regression. The y-axis is log-scaled. 
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Figure 4.3: Distribution of Directors by Number of Board Seats Gained Over 5 Years 
 
 
 
Black diamonds indicate distribution of number of new board seats gained over the five-year 
period from 1998 to 2002 inclusive. Shirley Ann Jackson gained ten new board appointments 
during this time. Red triangles indicate same distribution for the five-year period from 2006 to 
2010 inclusive. 
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Figure 4.4: Simulation Results for Number of Board Seats Gained, 2006–2010 
 
 
 
Results from 1200 trials of each scenario. Black lines delineate the 95% confidence interval for 
number of boards gained from 2006 to 2010 for Scenario 1, where the Matthew effect applied 
throughout the simulation period. Red lines delineate the 95% confidence interval for Scenario 2, 
where the Matthew effect disappeared after 2002. The number of directors gaining four or more 
board seats was significantly lower for Scenario 2 compared to Scenario 1. The lower (2.5 
percentile) bound line for Scenario 1 was projected down to the x-axis. 
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Figure 4.5: Simulated Distributions of Directors by Number of S&P 1500 Board Seats 
 
 
 
Results from 1200 trials of each scenario. Black lines delineate the 95% confidence interval for 
number of board seats in 2010 for Scenario 1, where the Matthew effect applied throughout the 
simulation period. Red lines delineate the 95% confidence interval for Scenario 2, where the 
Matthew effect disappeared after 2002.The number of directors with four or more board seats  in 
2010 was significantly lower for Scenario 2 compared to Scenario 1. The lower (2.5 percentile) 
bound lines were projected down to the x-axis. 
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Figure 4.6: Distribution of Directors by Number of S&P 1500 Board Seats, 2000 and 2010 
 
 
Inset shows detail for directors with four or more board seats.  
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Figure 4.7: Net Loss of Board Seats by Age for Directors with 6+ Board Seats in 2001 
 
 
 
The line is the prediction of an ordinary least-squares regression.  
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Figure 4.8: Degree Distributions for S&P 1500 Companies, 2000 and 2010 
 
  
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10111213141516171819202122232425262728293031323334353637
# 
o
f 
C
o
m
p
an
ie
s 
w
it
h
 D
eg
re
e
 
Degree 
2000
2010
 
 
73 
 
Figure 4.9: Degree Distributions for S&P 1500 Directors, 2000 and 2010 
 
Inset shows detail for directors sitting on the same boards with 43 or more other directors. 
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Figure 4.10: S&P 500 Interlock Network, 1996 and 2010 
 
 
 
Left figure is main component in 1996, right in 2010. 
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Figure 4.11: Mean Geodesic in Main Component of Board Interlock Networks, 1982-2010 
 
 
1982-1999 data from Davis et al. (2003); 1997-2010 this study; study population differs across 
the sources. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 4.1: Data Descriptions 
 
Variable Description 
Years since 1997 The data year minus 1997. 
Age & age
2
 RiskMetrics lists age as of the date of the proxy statement while Boardex 
lists age as of the data of data access. RiskMetrics often has conflicting 
age information for the same director. I converted each RiskMetrics age 
entry into age as of end of 2010, and then took the modal age if the ages 
listed for a director differed by less than two years for all pairs of entries. 
For those entries where there was no modal age or the difference between 
a pair of ages listed was greater than two years, I examined and corrected 
the entries manually, often using web searches to check birthdates and 
ages. Boardex data is as of late 2010. For cases where Boardex and 
corrected RiskMetrics ages differed by more than two years, I again 
corrected entries manually. Where Boardex and RiskMetrics ages differed 
but by no more than two years, Boardex-listed ages were used in the final 
dataset. 
Maximum number 
of employees 
(logged) 
For each director, I selected the largest company (by number of 
employees) whose board the director sat on during the focal year, and took 
the log of the number of employees. Preliminary analyses showed that 
using the largest company value instead of a median or average value has 
better predictive power. These analyses also showed that number of 
employees is a better predictor of additional board seats than company 
market value. 
Maximum annual 
return 
For each director, I selected the best performing company (by total annual 
market return) whose board the director sat on during the focal year. 
Preliminary analyses showed that using the largest company value instead 
of a median or average value has better predictive power. These analyses 
also showed that company market return is a better predictor of additional 
board seats than industry-standardized ROA or ROE. 
Female director Coded 1 for female directors. Data on gender came from both RiskMetrics 
and Boardex. First, in cases where RiskMetrics had conflicting listings of 
a director’s gender, I examined and corrected RiskMetrics data manually, 
using web searches to confirm the gender of the director in question. 
Second, I cross-checked gender between Boardex and RiskMetrics. Where 
there were discrepancies, I again manually corrected the entries. 
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Minority director Coded 1 for non-white directors. Ethnicity data came from RiskMetrics. 
RiskMetrics often lists conflicting ethnicity information for the same 
director in different years or on different boards. If one ethnicity was 
listed more than 75% of the time for a director, I used that ethnicity for the 
director. For each director for whom there was no such dominant ethnicity 
identification, I examined and determined the ethnicity manually, often 
using web searches to confirm the ethnicity of the director in question. 
Social elite director Directors were coded as a member of the social elite if they were white, 
male and had an educational affiliation with Harvard, Yale, Princeton, or 
Stanford listed in Boardex. Ethnicity, gender and elite education 
credentials have been shown to correspond with social elite membership 
(e.g., Useem and Karabel, 1986). The correlation between these 
demographic markers and elite membership is far from perfect, but is 
reasonable for directors during the period under study. 
Corporate executive Directors were identified as corporate executives in a given year if they 
were listed in RiskMetrics as being an employee director for a firm. 
Occasionally, directors may not be on the board of their employer, but sit 
only on an outside board or boards. These cases are not captured in the 
data. 
Director degree 
centrality 
Degree centrality measures for directors were calculated by flattening the 
bimodal data to create director-director networks for each year. Two 
directors are linked if they serve on the same board. 
Director 
eigenvector 
centrality 
Eigenvector centrality measures for directors were calculated by flattening 
the bimodal data to create director-director networks for each year. Two 
directors are linked if they serve on the same board. 
# of non-
overlapping boards 
served on by peer 
directors 
For the measure of peer director reach, I calculated the number of non-
overlapping boards each director’s peer directors sat on for each year, 
excluding any boards the focal director also sat on. 
Number of board 
seats held by 
director 
The number of board seats held by the director in the focal year. 
Joined board next 
year? 
Coded 1 if a director joined a new S&P 1500 board in the following 
calendar year. 
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficients 
 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Years since 1997 6.10 3.75           
2. Age 59.82 8.62 -0.03         
3. Age
2
 3652.65 1031.28 -0.16 1.00       
4. Maximum number of employees (logged) 3.97 0.69 -0.07 0.03 0.02     
5. Maximum annual return 12.55 55.57 -0.09 0.01 0.00 0.05   
6. Female director? (1 = yes) 0.11 0.31 -0.08 -0.18 -0.18 0.07 0.00 
7. Minority director? (1 = yes) 0.08 0.27 0.02 -0.11 -0.11 0.09 0.01 
8. Social elite director? (1 = yes) 0.13 0.34 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.02 
9. Corporate executive? (1 = yes) 0.23 0.42 0.05 -0.26 -0.26 0.02 0.01 
10. Director degree centrality 12.52 7.85 0.01 0.07 0.06 0.46 0.15 
11. Director eigenvector centrality 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.19 0.03 
12. # of non-overlapping boards for peer directors 8.15 9.93 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.53 0.11 
13. Number of board seats held by director* 1.29 0.58 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.38 0.18 
14. Joined new board next year? (1 = yes) 0.06 0.24 -0.05 -0.07 -0.07 0.08 0.02 
 
Variable 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
8. Social elite director? (1 = yes) -0.17 -0.14             
9. Corporate executive? (1 = yes) -0.16 -0.10 0.01           
10. Director degree centrality 0.05 0.09 0.04 0.04         
11. Director eigenvector centrality 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.38       
12. # of non-overlapping boards for peer directors 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.81 0.38     
13. Number of board seats held by director* 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.85 0.21 0.67   
14. Joined new board next year? (1 = yes) 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.04 0.12 0.09 
 
Number of board seats coded as an ordinal variable, with value 3 for three or more boards. 
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Table 4.3: Log-Odds of Director Gaining a New Board Appointment in Next Year 
  
Random effects panel logistic regression. 
  
DV = join board next year 
   
DV = join 
survivor  
panel board 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Years since 1997 -0.187 0.188 0.167 -1.059** 
  (-0.91) (1.01) (0.83) (-2.75) 
Age 0.351*** 0.428*** 0.405*** 0.496*** 
  (7.58) (9.95) (8.79) (5.84) 
Age
2
 -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005*** 
  (-8.37) (-10.62) (-9.39) (-6.48) 
Maximum number of employees (logged) 0.203*** 0.683*** 0.594*** 0.190* 
  (3.88) (16.73) (13.54) (2.37) 
Maximum annual return 0.001 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000 
  (1.21) (3.97) (3.35) (0.17) 
Female director -0.019   0.075 0.166 
  (-0.20)   (0.81) (1.24) 
Minority director 0.388***   0.500*** 0.666*** 
  (3.88)   (5.05) (5.00) 
Social elite director 0.307***   0.412*** 0.164 
  (4.31)   (5.84) (1.48) 
Corporate executive -0.182**   -0.071 0.154 
  (-2.82)   (-1.11) (1.61) 
Director degree centrality -0.030***     -0.032*** 
  (-4.66)     (-3.34) 
Director eigenvector centrality -2.562     -7.200 
  (-0.94)     (-1.50) 
# of boards served by peer directors 0.033***     0.039*** 
  (9.68)     (7.76) 
Number of board seats held by director (n=2) 0.607***     0.626*** 
  (7.42)     (5.05) 
Number of board seats held by director (n≥3) 0.656***     0.675** 
  (4.38)     (3.04) 
(Years since 1997) x         
Age 0.005 -0.004 -0.002 0.032* 
  (0.70) (-0.60) (-0.22) (2.40) 
Age
2
 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000* 
  (-0.67) (0.48) (0.07) (-2.27) 
Maximum number of employees (logged) 0.005 -0.030*** -0.037*** 0.025* 
  (0.62) (-5.29) (-5.90) (2.17) 
Maximum annual return -0.000 -0.000* -0.000* -0.000 
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  (-0.19) (-2.25) (-2.11) (-0.18) 
Female director 0.012   0.001 -0.010 
  (0.98)   (0.07) (-0.51) 
Minority director -0.021   -0.034* -0.037 
  (-1.56)   (-2.54) (-1.93) 
Social elite director -0.013   -0.023* -0.011 
  (-1.30)   (-2.23) (-0.67) 
Corporate executive 0.021*   0.010 0.025 
  (2.14)   (1.03) (1.72) 
Director degree centrality -0.001     0.000 
  (-1.19)     (0.07) 
Director eigenvector centrality -0.008     -0.202 
  (-0.02)     (-0.22) 
# of boards served by peer directors -0.000     0.001 
  (-0.28)     (0.71) 
Number of board seats held by director (n=2) -0.043**     -0.054** 
  (-3.28)     (-2.66) 
Number of board seats held by director (n≥3) -0.063*     -0.112** 
  (-2.48)     (-2.83) 
          
Year coefficients not shown. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. All tests two-tailed. 
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Table 4.4: Top-25 Degree Centrality Companies in S&P 1500 Interlock Network 
  
 
 
 
  
Year 2000 Year 2010
Rank Degree Company Rank Degree Company
1 37 SARA LEE 1 21 MARATHON OIL CORPORATION
1 37 ALLSTATE 2 20 NORTHERN TRUST CORPORATION
3 35 BANK OF AMERICA 2 20 STANLEY BLACK & DECKER, INC.
3 35 SBC COMMUNICATIONS 2 20 H. J. HEINZ COMPANY
5 34 BELL ATLANTIC 2 20 LOWE'S COMPANIES, INC.
6 33 CHASE MANHATTAN 6 19 THE PROGRESSIVE CORPORATION
6 33 SCHERING-PLOUGH 7 18 CATERPILLAR INC.
8 32 EXXONMOBIL 7 18 AON CORPORATION
9 30 XEROX 7 18 SUNTRUST BANKS, INC.
9 30 EQUIFAX 10 17 PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL, INC.
9 30 HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL 10 17 THE PNC FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC.
12 29 AMR 10 17 INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORP
12 29 BANK ONE 10 17 KEYCORP
12 29 SUNTRUST BANKS 10 17 UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION
12 29 KROGER 10 17 CHEVRON CORPORATION
16 28 PROTECTIVE LIFE 10 17 WELLS FARGO & COMPANY
16 28 KMART 10 17 MCDONALD'S CORPORATION
16 28 VULCAN MATERIALS 10 17 FMC TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
16 28 BELLSOUTH 10 17 PFIZER INC.
16 28 MINNESOTA MINING & MANUFACTURING (3M) 20 16 SPRINT NEXTEL CORPORATION
21 27 PROCTER & GAMBLE 20 16 THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON CORP
21 27 AT&T 20 16 ENPRO INDUSTRIES, INC.
21 27 UNION CARBIDE 23 15 ELI LILLY AND COMPANY
21 27 FLEET BOSTON 23 15 MEADWESTVACO CORPORATION
25 26 PEPSICO 23 15 NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORPORATION
25 26 AON 23 15 DEERE & COMPANY
25 26 SPRINGS INDUSTRIES 23 15 3M COMPANY
25 26 SUNOCO 23 15 QWEST COMMUNICATIONS INTERNATIONAL
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Table 4.5: Top-25 Degree Centrality Directors in S&P 1500 Interlock Network 
  
 
  
Year 2000 Year 2010
Rank Degree Director Age Gender Ethnicity Rank Degree Director Age Gender Ethnicity
1 101 VERNON E JORDAN JR 65 Male Black 1 53 SAM NUNN 72 Male White
2 81 RONALD L KUEHN JR 64 Male White 2 52 EDUARDO MENASCE 66 Male White
3 79 JOHN L CLENDENIN 65 Male White 3 51 FREDERIC V SALERNO 67 Male White
4 75 EDWARD E WHITACRE JR 58 Male White 3 51 ROBERT L RYAN 66 Male Black
5 70 WILLIE D DAVIS 66 Male Black 3 51 SHIRLEY A JACKSON 63 Female Black
6 69 ELAINE L CHAO 46 Female Asian 6 50 DENNIS H CHOOKASZIAN 66 Male White
6 69 CHARLES F KNIGHT 64 Male White 6 50 ARTHUR C MARTINEZ 70 Male White
8 66 LOUIS W SULLIVAN 66 Male Black 6 50 ENRIQUE HERNANDEZ JR 54 Male Hispanic
8 66 CHARLES W COKER 67 Male White 9 48 RICHARD J SWIFT 65 Male White
8 66 SAM NUNN 62 Male White 10 47 EDWARD J MOONEY 69 Male White
11 65 JOHN W SNOW 60 Male White 10 47 THOMAS J USHER 67 Male White
11 65 STEPHEN R HARDIS 64 Male White 10 47 JAMES H HANCE JR. 66 Male White
11 65 GEORGE J MITCHELL 66 Male White 13 46 KENNETH M DUBERSTEIN 65 Male White
11 65 LYNN M MARTIN 60 Female White 13 46 BARRY DILLER 68 Male White
11 65 FRANK S ROYAL 60 Male Black 13 46 RICHARD B MYERS 68 Male White
11 65 JACQUELYN M WARD 62 Female White 13 46 WILLIAM H. GRAY III 69 Male Black
17 64 HANS W BECHERER 64 Male White 17 45 STEVEN S REINEMUND 61 Male White
17 64 ANN M KOROLOGOS 58 Female White 17 45 MANUEL A FERNANDEZ 63 Male Hispanic
19 63 IVAN G SEIDENBERG 53 Male White 19 44 J MICHAEL LOSH 64 Male White
19 63 JAMES F HARDYMON 65 Male White 19 44 HANSEL E TOOKES II 63 Male Black
21 62 MARY JOHNSTON EVANS 70 Female White 19 44 LAURA D'ANDREA TYSON 63 Female White
22 61 ALAN T DICKSON 68 Male White 22 43 CHARLES R LEE 70 Male White
23 60 BRIAN H ROWE 69 Male White 22 43 JAMES H BLANCHARD 68 Male White
24 59 ROBERT P LUCIANO 66 Male White 22 43 ROBERT T BRADY 70 Male White
24 59 JOHN R STAFFORD 62 Male White 22 43 R DAVID HOOVER 64 Male White
24 59 JOHN G BREEN 66 Male White 22 43 KRISS CLONINGER III 62 Male White
24 59 DONALD F MCHENRY 63 Male Black 22 43 CHARLENE BARSHEFSKY 60 Female White
24 59 DONALD V FITES 66 Male White 22 43 JOHN C. MALONE 70 Male White
24 59 BOBBY R INMAN 69 Male White 22 43 VIRGIS W. COLBERT 71 Male Black
24 59 PAUL FULTON 65 Male White
24 59 LEONARD S COLEMAN 50 Male White
24 59 FRANKLIN A THOMAS 65 Male Black
24 59 RAY J GROVES 64 Male White
24 59 ROZANNE L RIDGWAY 65 Female White
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Characteristic 1904 1912 1919 1935 1964 1969 1974 1999 2000 2010
Number of connected firms 154 140 143 145 153 153 145 811 425 440
3-step reach of most central corporation (%) 90.9 81.9 85.5 80.7 90.4 91.0 84.9 82.4 84.2 60.9
Directors on 6 or more boards 24 27 14 3 4 2 0 * 8 0
† 1904-1974 data from Mizruchi (1982: 105-108); 1999 from Davis et al. (2003: 320); 2000-2010 this study; study population differs across 
   the three sources.
* Data not available in source article.
Table 4.6: Characteristics of the Board Interlock Network, 1912-2010 
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Chapter 5: 
Discussion 
 
 
5.1 Overall Summary 
The central premise of this dissertation is that increased competition and more level 
competition benefit and entrench dominants, by preventing non-dominants from rising to 
dominance. Chapter 2 presented a simple model showing that this proposition is plausible. 
Chapters 3 and 4 presented empirical support for this proposition in two very different 
contexts—mutual funds competing for investor dollars and S&P 1500 directors accruing board 
seats. In the former context, the entry of similar new funds disadvantaged the vast majority of 
incumbent funds, but dominant funds (those with an order of magnitude more assets under 
management than other funds with similar portfolios) benefited tremendously from new 
competitive entry. New competitive entry increased flows of investor funds to dominant funds 
and increased the probability that the dominant fund would stay dominant over long time 
periods. In the latter context, the leveling of the playing field in board hiring made it difficult for 
non-dominant directors to rise to dominance. Directors already sitting on many boards were 
more likely to gain additional board seats compared to directors on one board in the twentieth 
century, but this advantage disappeared in the early 200s. This shift in the micro-dynamics of 
director hiring prevented new directors from accumulating many board seats. As dominant 
directors retired from board service, no new dominants took their place, and the century-old 
inner circle of U.S. corporate governance disappeared. 
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Further investigations, both empirical and theoretical, are called for to help answer two 
remaining questions about the proposed theory. First, does this relationship between competition 
and entrenched dominance hold generally across many contexts—what are the boundary 
conditions for the occurrence of durable dominance? Second, how consequential are processes of 
durable dominance in shaping outcomes? 
  
5.2 Thoughts on the General Validity of the Theory 
Empirical Generalizability 
The general validity of the theory can be—and needs to be—established in two ways: 
empirically and theoretically. Further empirical investigations may look at other settings where 
dominants have maintained dominance in the face of increased competition or more level rules 
of competition. Such settings could include the entrenched dominance of the top Hollywood 
movie stars of the early 1990s. These stars (e.g., Tom Cruise, Brad Pitt, Julia Roberts) have 
maintained the ability to garner starring roles in feature films for an unprecedentedly long period, 
even as the number of newly-minted starring actors has soared. Top music acts of the early 
1990s (e.g., Radiohead) also maintain their dominance today. Another setting of interest is the 
market for academic ideas, where it appears that old theories established before explosive growth 
in the number of publishing scholars and yearly published papers tend to remain canonical field-
wide theories, while newer theories have only parochial impact. Study of industry settings such 
as the U.S. beer market, where Anheuser-Busch products maintain dominance even though (or 
because of) an explosion of new craft-beer entrants, may also provide useful insight into the 
dynamics of durable dominance. 
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Going beyond settings where entrenched dominants are easily identified, further research 
also needs to establish boundary conditions for the appearance of durable dominance. This can 
be through comparative case studies or by large-n regressions using large panel datasets. A case 
study comparing Google’s competitive actions in the web application market and its actions in 
the smart phone market could yield takeaways on when a policy of fostering smaller competitors 
can work to a company’s advantage, for example. In the former market, Google was dominant 
and remains dominant while maintaining a policy of fostering small entrepreneurial startups. In 
the latter market, Google followed a similar strategy of fostering new smart phone manufacturers. 
Apple rather than Google was dominant at the beginning of this strategy, and remains so. 
Studying industries characterized by waves of disruptive innovation, such as the hard disk drive 
and steel industries (Christensen, 1997) could also yield important insights. Do processes of 
durable dominance act even in industries characterized by disruptive innovation (after all, 
Seagate still ships $15 billion of hard disk drives per year)? How do processes of durable 
dominance and disruptive innovation interact?  
Large-n panel studies examining industries over time would help develop a better 
understanding of the boundary conditions for processes of durable dominance. Within-industry 
studies of industries that are segmented geographically and thus have differing rates of new entry 
could provide support for (or evidence against) the proposed theory. Localized changes in 
legislation that level the playing field between large and small could provide useful cross-
sectional variation to test the theory. Between-industry studies would help establish boundary 
conditions for the theory’s validity. 
The predictions of the theory may also be applicable to natural and physical systems. 
Consider an example from population genetics: predicting how long an allele remains the most-
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frequent allele in a population subject to mutations. Established theory addresses a related 
question, and argues that the higher the mutation rate the less likely the most frequent allele is to 
be the oldest (Watterson and Guess, 1977). This dissertation’s theory suggests this should hold 
true only when the mutation rate is below a critical threshold. If there is no mutation and a 
highly-skewed initial distribution of allele frequencies, then the most-frequent allele at the 
beginning of the study will remain most frequent indefinitely. As mutation rates increase from 
zero, the probability of a different allele becoming most frequent will increase, as Watterson and 
Guess (1977) predict. If mutation rates increase past a critical point, however, the probability of a 
new allele outnumbering the initially most-frequent allele becomes negligible. Less frequent 
alleles are more likely to be mutated out of existence than the most-frequent allele. The most-
frequent allele becomes, in this dissertation’s parlance, durably dominant18. This prediction could 
be tested in a petri dish. 
Theoretical Generalizability: Laws versus Mechanisms 
If the causal relationship between increased and more level competition and dominant 
entrenchment is observed consistently in a wide range of settings, including non-social systems, 
this would suggest that the theory of durable dominance may be somewhat more than a 
mechanism (a “sometimes-true” theory [Coleman, 1964: 516]) and closer to a social “law”—a 
most-often-true theory. Law-based theorizing has fallen out of favor among organizational 
scholars, but I argue below that this mode of theory-building is sometimes useful.  
                                                          
 
18
 If you keep increasing the mutation rate even more, even the most-frequent allele will be 
mutated too often to maintain its numbers. The most-frequent allele will change often, and will 
only be represented in a small portion of the population. 
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Davis and Marquis (2005) advocate for mechanism-based theorizing as the mode of 
scholarship best suited to advance organization theory in a world characterized by constant 
change. They argue that, “The notion of a ‘theory of organizations’ now seems like naïve 
scientism, like a theory of diesel trucks, or a theory of hitchhiking. Organizations simply are not 
the kind of thing amenable to general theory.” (Davis and Marquis, 2005: 335) This argument 
makes sense. Social scientists striving to understand complicated social phenomena benefit by 
not over-simplifying their subject. Too high a level of abstraction, metaphor, or “just-so” 
functionalist explanation creates non-falsifiable, uninstructive theory (Weick, 1974). 
On the other hand, the current social scientific aversion to theorizing general laws and 
paradigms can also be harmful. The tradeoff here is that building an arsenal of social 
mechanisms helps explain events post-hoc, but does not provide predictive power to predict 
outcomes before they occur. Many social mechanisms are at work in any given social situation. 
The more intriguing and important the social situation, the more studied by scholars, each 
striving to introduce one yet more unexpected but plausible (cf. Davis, 1977: 343) mechanism to 
explain the observed phenomena. As a result, any important outcome can be explained by several 
different mechanisms
19
. Conversely, if an effect predicted by a favored mechanism is not 
observed, a multitude of mechanisms are available to explain the non-occurrence. Social 
mechanisms cannot be generally falsified. They sometimes act, sometimes don’t, sometimes act 
with other mechanisms, and sometimes are negated by other mechanisms. This leads to a lack of 
                                                          
 
19
 The Management & Organizations area Ph.D. preliminary examinations require students to 
produce three different alternative theoretical explanations for the empirical findings of a 
recently-published paper from a top-tier management journal. No paper has withstood the 
theoretical assault of second-year students and come away unscathed. 
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predictive and policy power
20
. Compare this situation in organization theory with Physics (great 
predictions and policy power) and Economics (not so great predictions, great policy power). 
Law-like theories make broader claims about reality. They argue that certain causal 
effects will most likely be observed, rather than that such effects may be observed. This leads to 
a higher empirical and theoretical bar to their acceptance by the scholarly community. On the 
other hand, once a law has been established empirically and theoretically, we can make 
predictions. A history of correct predictions changes our assumptions about organizational 
behavior, and thus the questions we ask. Explaining normal is not interesting, and laws define 
normal. Before a law is well-established theoretically, elaborating more mechanisms 
underpinning the law is useful. Such investigations provide a better understanding of the law’s 
general validity and boundary conditions. For an established law, however, identifying new 
mechanisms becomes less useful, and the lack of an identified mechanism should not cause us to 
expect the law does not apply in any given situation. 
Some of the most useful organization theories have a law-like character. For example, 
resource partitioning (Carroll, 1985) is observed across a range of settings. Similarly, nodes 
spanning structural holes in social networks tend to enjoy advantages (Burt, 1992). In any given 
setting, however, it is not obvious why resource partitioning or broker advantage occurs. The 
“resource” in resource partitioning could be technology, managerial attention, investment 
funding, consumer attention, consumer categories, etc. Brokers spanning structural holes in 
networks could benefit because they enjoy faster access to knowledge, more bricolage 
opportunities, increased flow of resources through them, control over others, control over 
                                                          
 
20
 Ironically, this is more so the more empirically-supported mechanisms scholars catalog. This 
phenomenon is congruent with this dissertation’s theory. 
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themselves, etc. These theories are often attacked for this lack of clarity on the causal micro-
dynamics (mechanisms) underpinning their main effect, and the theories’ principal proponents 
have spent time responding with recent projects focused on specific mechanisms (e.g., Carroll 
and Wheaton, 2009; Burt, 2012.)  
 The inability to pin down which micro-mechanism is causing the main effect (e.g., small 
firms proliferating in the presence of large firms, broker advantage) may actually be strengths of 
these theories, however. The plenitude of mechanisms militating for the effect versus the paucity 
of mechanisms operating counter to the effect give the effect its law-like character. Given the 
many-factored, stochastic, and idiosyncratic nature of social phenomena, over-determined 
phenomenological regularities may be the closest we get to social “laws”, even if (especially if) 
we can’t understand exactly why they hold in all situations. 
Durable dominance may be similarly over-determined. In Chapter 2, I described a 
mechanism of competitive release. Companies at the dominance threshold faced increased 
competitive pressure from similar-size competitors, and diverted managerial attention and 
resources to compete against these similar competitors. Near-dominant actors could not spare 
attention and resources to attack the dominant. The dominant could concentrate on building their 
lead, freed from fending off direct attacks from non-dominants. I also described a mechanism 
based on consumer attention. The existence of many near-dominants creates a cognitive burden 
for the consumer choosing between options, and the consumer will be more likely to forego 
serious comparison and just opt for a dominant’s offerings, rather than incurring the costs to 
compare all offerings from dominant and near-dominant companies. Mechanisms based on 
allocation of managerial attention, resources, or consumer attention could all lead to durable 
dominance. 
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Other mechanisms can also undergird durable dominance. An influx of new competitors 
may make capacity investments by near-dominants more risky, preventing them from 
challenging the dominant. Resource partitioning may work in reverse: Instead of a dominant firm 
crowding out the middle and creating space for small peripheral competitors, a large mass of 
small peripheral competitors may crowd out the middle and allow the dominant to thrive. A large 
influx of new entrants may increase the legitimacy of the industry segment as a whole. The 
company dominant at the time of this legitimization may become entrenched as the paradigmatic 
exemplar of the segment. Establishing the operation of these and other mechanisms to create 
durable dominance can help establish the theoretical generalizability of the proposed theory. 
The theory’s claim to general validity may also be strengthened using an analytical 
approach. In exploratory investigations using automata-based simulations, I find that a wide 
range of measures to increase churn in rankings (i.e., increase equality in opportunity) lead to 
dominant entrenchment. If the initial distribution of endowments is highly skewed, almost all 
changes in transition rules to make opportunity more equal benefit the top. This result suggests 
that formal theorems on the effects of changes in rank and endowment transition rules on 
dominant entrenchment can be established, both in the time-discrete automata regime and in the 
continuous time regime. The latter regime can be modeled as a set of stocks and flows equations 
from Physics.  
 
5.3 Significance and Implications 
Even if observed with law-like regularity, an effect is not interesting if it explains little. 
Durable dominance by its nature attempts to explain the macrostructure of industries and other 
fields of competition. The studies in this dissertation help us understand how Fidelity maintains 
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dominance atop the mutual fund industry and why the century-old inner circle of U.S. corporate 
board directors disappeared, for example. The theory of durable dominance presented here is 
consequential, and suggests a novel way of viewing the relationship between competition and 
dominance.  
This changed perspective holds implications for scholars and practitioners. Economics, 
strategy, and sociology have been tremendously successful at generating theories explaining 
dominant entrenchment based on exclusion, collusion, and monopolization. This dissertation is a 
first step in developing and validating theory that explains durable dominance—dominant 
entrenchment in the face of (or because of) mass entrepreneurial entry and decreased advantages 
of scale in settings where resources are abundant and widely-available. The proposed theory 
suggests that dominants can maintain distinction—competitive advantage—in a world with no 
distinctive, monopolizable resources. Durable dominants distinguish themselves by magnitude 
rather than exclusivity; more of each resource, not different resources. Elite prep school students, 
for example, no longer pride themselves on their access to highbrow culture, but rather on being 
able to enjoy a large range of cultural experiences, the scope of which those from less privileged 
backgrounds find difficult to emulate (Khan, 2011). An order of magnitude difference in 
resources can lead to qualitative differences in capabilities. Those earning $4 million a year 
travel in private jets, those earning $400,000 in business class, and $40,000 earners in coach. 
Easy transposibility and mobility of resources may act to entrench magnitude-based 
distinction. Wealth, which is highly scalable, is also increasingly transposable. For individuals, 
wealth can buy the “right” type of cultural distinction, which can then be transposed into 
lucrative careers (Rivera, 2012). Companies, too, can transpose wealth into and from other 
needed resources. High status law firms generate increased profits by attracting partners from 
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lower-status but high profit firms. Conversely, lower status but high profit firms purchase status 
by hiring partners from high status firms with lower profits (Rider and Tan, 2012). Product 
companies can readily purchase scalable resources—manufacturing, marketing, distribution, 
financing, operations—on the Internet. If all resources are widely available and easily 
transposable into others, the only differentiator is who has more, not who has what. 
This line of thought forces a shift in how we think about dominant entrenchment. Rather 
than considering dominant tactics of exclusion, collusion, and monopolization, we need to 
consider the ecological distribution of resources among competitors and the trajectories of these 
resource distributions. The proposed theory predicts that durable dominance is contingent on 
order of magnitude differences between dominants’ and non-dominants levels of contested 
resources. Given such a highly-skewed distribution of resources, if the non-dominant have no 
way of accumulating resources an order of magnitude greater than what they currently possess, 
they cannot become dominant—and durable dominance occurs.  
Analyzing highly-skewed distributions requires separating the analysis of dominants 
from that of non-dominants. The “1%” are different from the rest, but averaging or taking the 
median over the population obfuscates these differences. Gathering data on dominants often 
presents an empirical difficulty, however. Data on the richest Americans, for example, are rarely 
available in general social surveys. Nonetheless, this study shows that gathering and analyzing 
data on highly-skewed distributions is possible, and necessary to understand durable dominance. 
The policy implications of the proposed theory are straightforward but counterintuitive. 
Dominants may benefit from a strategy of opening their markets to new entrants and fostering 
small competitors. These upstarts will weaken potential challenges to the dominants’ dominance 
from large but non-dominant incumbents. Whether guided by altruism or cunning, this seems 
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precisely the strategy that Google, for example, is executing when it routinely provides funding, 
employees, technology, and platform access to web startups. An elite business school worried 
about losing its elite status could conceivably attempt to entrench its position by investing 
resources in democratizing massive open online course (MOOC) creation and distribution. 
Giving away access to world-class production and distribution technologies to small colleges 
could flood the marketplace with new entrants, force other schools immediately below elite 
status to invest resources in developing their own MOOC capabilities, and ultimately entrench 
the hypothetical protagonist’s elite position.  
Policy-makers and non-dominants face a more difficult choice. The proposed theory 
suggests that currently taken-for-granted measures for loosening dominants’ hold on contested 
resources may backfire—unless the measures are executed in tandem with reductions in 
dominants’ vastly disproportionate resources to levels near their competitors’ averages. Durable 
dominance may be a natural and inevitable consequence of an open society (such as today’s 
United States) where wealth is unlimited and eminently transposable, and competition is revered.  
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Appendix A: 
Cosine Similarity 
 
Funds are represented as vectors in stock space, and cosine similarity is defined as the 
cosine of the angle between two funds. In the simple two-stock example pictured in Figure A.1, 
Fund 1 holds $5 million in Stock A and $0 in Stock B, and is represented by the vector (5, 0). 
Fund 2 holds $2 million in Stock B and none in Stock A. Fund 3 holds $2 million in stock A and 
$1 million in stock B. The cosine similarities for fund pairs 1-2, 1-3, and 2-3 respectively are 0, 
2/√ , and 1/√ . Similarity values are calculated numerically using the vector inner product: 
cos(XY) = 
   
| || |
. 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure A.1 about here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
The actual stock space is high-dimensional, with as many dimensions as distinct domestic 
stocks held by mutual funds. Multi-dimensional scaling or network layout techniques allow us to 
project this space onto a 2- or 3-dimensional map. The nodes in this map are mutual funds, and 
similar (in portfolio composition) mutual funds will be clustered together in the map. This map 
can then be used to explore the structure of the mutual fund market and its evolution over time 
(Figures A.2 and A.3). 
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The models proposed in this paper suggest that the identity of dominants will sometimes 
change when the number of funds in a segment is still small, but that the dominant fund at the 
time of an explosion in the number of funds in the segment will remain dominant for a long time 
thereafter. This intuition can be explored visually, as in Figure A.2. 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure A.2 about here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
The cosine similarity measure may be useful for other research studies. The mutual fund 
similarity and mapping data is of obvious interest to scholars interested in the industry evolution 
of mutual funds. The data can show the creation and growth of new fund types, movement of 
groups of funds in stock space, and movement of funds between groups (see Figure A.3). The 
dataset may also be of use to researchers studying categories and network communities. 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure A.3 about here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
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FIGURES 
 
Figure A.1: A Simple Two-Stock Cosine Similarity Example 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cosine similarity is defined as the cosine of the angle between two funds, when the funds are 
represented as vectors in stock space. 
 
  
cos(θ) = 
1
√5
 
cos(θ) = 0 
cos(θ) = 
2
√5
 
Stock B 
Stock A 
Fund 2: (0, 2) 
Fund 3: (2, 1) 
Fund 1: (5, 0) 
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Figure A.2: Dominant Change within a Community (Mockup) 
 
 
 
The points in the figure represent mutual funds. Funds with similar stock holdings are placed 
closer together on the map.  
The red dot represents the dominant fund at Time 1. By Time 2, the yellow dot fund has become 
dominant, but is replaced by Time 3 by the black dot fund. The community grows rapidly from 
Time 3 to Time 5, and the black dot fund maintains its dominance throughout this growth. 
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Figure A.3: Mutual Fund Industry Evolution (Mockup) 
 
 
 
The points in the figure represent mutual funds. Funds with similar stock holdings are placed 
closer together on the map.  
Five distinct communities (including one isolate) exist at Time 1. By time 2: New entrants have 
increased the number of funds in the top-left community, while fund exits have decreased the 
size of the top-right community. The bottom-left community has broken apart into two 
communities. Several funds from the central community have joined the isolate on the bottom 
right.  
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